Feminism and Trans Rights

Transfeminism and TERFS: A Clash Between Biology and Ideology

Since its inception in the 19th century, feminism has had internal divisions. In the movement’s first wave, centred on the fight for suffrage, feminists disagreed among themselves about temperance and birth control. The second wave swirled into even more disparate eddies -- Marxist feminists, liberal feminists, lesbian separatists, pro- and anti-abortion feminists -- before crashing dramatically into the feminist sex wars of the 1980s. In our current cultural moment, we are witnessing yet another feminist schism over the definition of woman: is a transgender woman a woman, or is a transgender woman a man? 

On one front,  the RadFems: radical feminists who claim that women are adult human females, and feminism should be committed to combating the world-wide oppression of females by males. According to the activist group Radfem Collective, the central tenet of radical feminism is “that women as a biological class are globally oppressed by men as a biological class.” Patriarchy, the systematic institutionalisation of male supremacy, has produced the fiction of gender, a “socially constructed hierarchy which functions to repress female autonomy and has no basis in biology.” Radical feminists seek to preserve female-only spaces from which to develop theory and action based on the “lived reality of females who have been socialised into womanhood.” Squaring off against the RadFems are trans-inclusive feminists, those who claim that “woman” is not a sex-based category, but rooted in gender identity, one’s inner sense of self. The rallying cry of trans-inclusive feminists is this: trans women are women. The Human Rights Council, a prominent LGBT+ advocacy organisation, provides tips on how to make feminism trans-inclusive, and defines “a woman’s gender identity” as “her innermost concept of being female.” Not only is it possible, from this perspective, for a biological male to be a woman; a male who becomes a woman was never truly male in the first place, but always female. 

Simone de Beauvoir published The Second Sex between the first and second feminist waves. This 800-page book contains a sentence that changed feminist thinking. "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman," she wrote. This statement rejects essentialism. It views "woman" as a social construct, not a natural one. De Beauvoir did not use the word "gender." Yet, her sentence planted the idea for the sex/gender split in feminist theory. In the 1970s, feminists began separating biological sex from gender. Gender referred to social roles and expressions. These are linked to being male or female. They are social, not biological. Feminists used "female" for biological sex. They used "woman" for gender. Claims about women as a natural category were then forbidden. Essentialism is usually contrasted with constructionism, the belief that the categories of “man” and “woman” are not rooted in nature or ontology, but produced by interconnected societal forces. 

This strict rejection of essentialism created a conflict in feminism. How could feminism rely on, yet deny, the universal idea of woman? To solve this, many feminists adopted nominalism. The disavowal of “real” essences in favour of “nominal” or name-only essences: linguistic categories used for political convenience.  

Radical Feminism: Difference Means Being Ruled

Behind activist slogans are deeper ideas. These ideas shape how people see reality and oppression. Catharine MacKinnon is a famous feminist lawyer and thinker. Her book Feminism Unmodified explains radical feminism.

Radical and Transfeminist groups now clash fiercely. They compete for control over language, law, and public thought. 

MacKinnon wrote in the 1980s. This was at the end of the second wave. Feminists were fighting about pornography and prostitution. Some saw them as harmful to women. Others felt they could be liberating. MacKinnon strongly opposed pornography. She critiqued some second-wave feminism. She felt it wrongly assumed women must be like men for equality. MacKinnon argued that sex equality laws did not give women what they needed. They did not provide security, self-expression, or respect.

MacKinnon says second-wave feminism used a "difference approach." This approach saw sex equality as about sameness and difference. She points to the phrase "sex equality." Equality implies sameness. Sex implies difference. The difference approach gave women two choices. They could be the same as men. Or they could be different from men. The problem was that men were always the standard. Women had to compare themselves to men. Second-wave feminists argued, "We are as good as you!" MacKinnon acknowledges this approach brought gains. It led to more access to jobs, education, and the military. However, she notes women still lack equal pay. They also lack equal work. Pay is still not equal for equal work. MacKinnon argues that focusing on "equality" or women's sameness to men. This threatens women-only spaces. It also suggests laws should not consider women's unique biological needs.

MacKinnon proposes a different way of defining equality. Instead of focusing on difference, she advocates looking at dominance. Equality is not a question of sameness and differences, she argues, but a question of the distribution of power. MacKinnon pushes back against so-called “difference feminists,” like Carol Gilligan, who tried to cast apparent gender differences in a positive light. Gilligan is most famous for her “ethics of care,” an approach that accepts the common belief that women are more caring and nurturing, and presents this as an asset women have that should be valued more highly by society. MacKinnon rejects Gilligan’s approach, asserting that the very idea of “sex difference” is a creation of male supremacy. Women are not inherently more caring, she writes. Rather, “women value care because men have valued us according to the care we give them.” For MacKinnon, “difference” is simply sexism, reified.

In MacKinnon’s framework, social problems caused by male domination masquerade as mere differences and thus overlook problems exclusive to women, such as violence against women, sexual assault and abuse, prostitution, and pornography. These ills, she argues, do not have a biological or evolutionary basis, but are socio-political in origin. The difference approach should be rejected, because it uncritically accepts the social status quo and is fundamentally masculinist, rather than feminist. For MacKinnon, only the dominance approach, which takes female subordination as its starting point, can truly be deemed feminist.

Because the ground of a RadFem worldview is male domination, the notion that a male could opt into a female identity is just another iteration of male entitlement and supremacy. RadFems are biological realists, but not biological determinists. It is not merely biology per se that defines the category of woman—that would be biological essentialism. For RadFems, what unites and defines women as a group is the pervasive social oppression experienced by biologically female human beings. 

Crenshaw connects current politics with postmodern ideas. Her work assumes social categories are built by language, not nature. This echoes Judith Butler’s view. They both see reality as socially constructed. Crenshaw, however, uses identity categories for political aims. Early Butler also explored this. Later, Butler adapted her ideas to include transgender identities. She even used intersectionality's language. adical feminists also use intersectionality. They recognise class and race affect women's oppression. However, their core belief remains male dominance over females based on sex.

Second-wave feminists followed Simone de Beauvoir. They saw "woman" as an identity born of oppression. It was not a natural category. This idea, embedded in the sex/gender divide, led to the view that trans women are women. It is hard to fight fixed ideas. Then, it is hard to stop men from identifying as women. Trans-inclusive feminism grew from radical feminism. It now seems to conflict with its parent.

Both feminist types rely on postmodern, anti-realist ideas. They see reality as shaped by power. Michel Foucault's ideas influence most current feminism. He proposed extreme social constructionism. This idea is now common in humanities. It is especially prevalent in gender studies. Judith Butler, a follower of Foucault, credits him. He showed how power disguises itself as reality. So, what seems real is actually a product of social and institutional power.

TransFems, influenced by Judith Butler, see the male-female sex binary as a medical construct. They argue it is not based on natural facts. Crenshaw's intersectionality also uses this postmodern idea. She suggests that categories we think are natural are really social creations. MacKinnon's dominance theory echoes Foucault. She claims differences between men and women are not real. Instead, patriarchy creates them and treats them as facts. Trans-inclusive feminism applies this idea. It sees "femaleness" as a product of male domination. This fits MacKinnon's view that difference comes from power.