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The reversal of Roe v Wade, was a decision which gave all state governments the freedom to decide their own abortion regimes.
Those policy differences reflect America’s growing ideological polarisation. “State policies vary more than they ever have before,” says Chris Warshaw of George Washington University, co-author of a forthcoming book, “Dynamic Democracy”. As states go in different directions on social and economic policy, the consequences will be deeply felt by all Americans, regardless of their place on the political spectrum, with implications around the world.
To quantify the divergence among states, Mr Warshaw and Devin Caughey of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology analysed 190 policies from the 1930s to 2021. On the whole, states have become more liberal. 2023 Ohio amended its constitution making a ban on abortion unconstitutional. They have unwound, for example, racial restrictions, bans on women serving on juries and laws criminalising sodomy. Although the general movement has been to the left, states’ presidential voting patterns have shifted to reflect their policy preferences.
However, states have also moved farther apart on policy, with a much larger gap between those most to the right and those most to the left. Data for 2022 are likely to show “massively more divergence”, predicts Mr Warshaw.
The Pew Research Center illustrate the increasingly stark disagreement between Democrats and Republicans on the economy, racial justice, climate change, law enforcement, international engagement, and a long list of other issues. The 2020 presidential election further highlighted these deep-seated divides. Supporters of Biden and Donald Trump believe the differences between them are about more than just politics and policies. A month before the election, roughly 8 in 10 registered voters in both camps said their differences with the other side were about core American values, and roughly 9 in 10—again in both camps—worried that a victory by the other would lead to “lasting harm” to the United States.
Take California and Mississippi. They have moved to the left and to the right, respectively, since 1970, with small exceptions (when a southerner, Jimmy Carter, won over Mississippians, and Ronald Reagan wooed California). The difference in terms of state-level policy is more recent and more dramatic. Meanwhile, formerly centrist states like Vermont or Kansas have implemented policies to match the party they have moved towards in presidential elections. Liberal-Republican and conservative-Democrat states, like Alaska or Arkansas, have all but disappeared.
Some in the other half are passing laws to codify abortion rights or protect health-care providers. Connecticut has expanded access by allowing physician assistants and nurse-midwives to perform abortions. In August Kansans defeated a proposed constitutional amendment restricting abortion. There will be measures on abortion on at least five state ballots this year, a record. In two of them, California and Vermont, voters are expected to enshrine reproductive rights in their constitutions.
But there is more than reproductive rights at stake. Guns are another battleground. So far this year ten states have imposed new restrictions on the purchase or carrying of firearms. Meanwhile, states with Republican governors and legislatures are pushing for fewer restrictions. Many have embraced “permitless carry” laws, which remove all restrictions on gun-owners being armed in public. In June Ohio became the 23rd state to allow this. The same month, its Republican governor, Mike DeWine, signed a law lowering the number of hours’ training that teachers require if they are to bring guns into classrooms from 700 to 24.
The treatment of undocumented immigrants is a third area of divergence. Enforcing immigration law has generally been taken to be the prerogative of the federal government. Increasingly, though, states are changing the experience and outcomes for their undocumented residents. Through various laws, California has “de facto legalised” undocumented immigrants, says Ken Miller, a professor at Claremont McKenna College. In June it became the first state to start offering Medicaid, the government health-insurance scheme for the poor, to all low-income adults regardless of immigration status.
Texas is pushing in the opposite direction. Its governor, Greg Abbott, has declined to expand Medicaid to any more low-income Texans, let alone non-citizens. He has ordered state police to start bringing unauthorised immigrants back to the border. Mr Abbott has also said he wants to stop paying for undocumented children to attend public schools. What the children who do go to school must be taught (such as ethnic studies in California, or African-American and Latino studies in Connecticut) and must not be taught (such as critical race theory in a number of states) is a whole other story.
Another area where state policies are starting to have national impact is that of voting and election administration as it relates to early voting access, voter ID requirements, mail-in voting and whether felons should be re-enfranchised. In 2021, 29 states expanded access to voting by mail, while 13 states restricted it. Many Republican-dominated states are taking aim at election administration, for example by shifting oversight authority away from non-partisan bureaucrats to political actors. This could complicate states’ certification of election results.
America’s national identity as a collection of states is written into the country’s very name. The 13 colonies-turned-states were wary of federal power subjugating their own. They needed to be assured of autonomy if they were to ratify the constitution. That need was most acutely felt when it came to the degree of autonomy slave states felt they needed for their own race-based subjugations, but the issue was broader than that. The founders thought a federal republic of distinct and diverse states would be protected from the spread of dangerous zealotry. As James Madison wrote, “The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states.”
Why is America cleaved in this way? The polarizing pressures of partisan media, social media, and even deeply rooted cultural, historical, and regional divides are hardly unique to America. By comparison, America’s relatively rigid, two-party electoral system stands apart by collapsing a wide range of legitimate social and political debates into a singular battle line that can make differences appear even larger than they may actually be. And when the balance of support for these political parties is close enough for either to gain near-term electoral advantage—as it has in the U.S. for more than a quarter century—the competition becomes cutthroat and politics begins to feel zero-sum, where one side’s gain is inherently the other’s loss. Finding common cause—even to fight a common enemy in the public health and economic threat posed by the coronavirus—has eluded many Americans. According to Carothers and O’Donohue, a “powerful alignment of ideology, race, and religion renders America’s divisions unusually encompassing and profound. It is hard to find another example of polarization in the world,” they write, “that fuses all three major types of identity divisions in a similar way.”
The Republican Party outside the South also moved to the right. In the mid-to-late 1970s, evangelical Christians became active in national politics. Their grievances placed them on the far right of the political spectrum, and they entered the Republican Party in droves. In response to liberal legislative victories on issues such as environmental and consumer protection, business became more active in politics, and a number of conservative think tanks were founded or revamped. The seeming failure of Keynesian economics in 1970s with stagflation gave an opening, and then credibility, to conservative economists and economic thinkers of the Wall Street Journal editorial page type. Conservatives reevaluated the benefits of globalisation which they saw has harming American jobs as manufacturing relocated to Asia and China was seen to engage in unfair trade and intellectual theft. Cultural change in attitudes to gender identity and revisionist views of American history led to the politicisation of school curriculums. The 2008 economic crisis followed by severe recession.
Explaining Polarisation
Explaining Polarisation
Scholars acknowledge that polarization is evident in the United States, although there is less agreement on the reasons behind this polarization and how it has become a significant aspect of American politics. Various theories have been proposed.
The decline of localism and the rise of issue politics
The decline of localism and the rise of issue politics
One of the most compelling arguments suggests that polarization is a phenomenon linked to the party-in-government, driven by decades of voter realignment or changes in party loyalty in response to shifts in party ideology. According to this sorting thesis, prior to the 1950s, voters were mainly focused on state-level party issues rather than national concerns. As parties are grassroots organizations, this focus on local matters dominated elections, leading national politicians to prioritize local issues over national party dynamics. In recent decades, voters have increasingly aligned themselves with national party politics, prompting them to expect their elected officials to be more responsive to national party positions. Consequently, voters are now more inclined to choose parties that consistently reflect national values, demonstrate uniformity in candidate selection, and elect representatives who are likely to adhere to their party's national agenda. One significant example of how social change has influenced party sorting relates to race. The Democratic Party regained national influence in the 1930s primarily due to a coalition formed among low-income voters in northern and midwestern cities. These new Democratic supporters were more religiously and ethnically diverse compared to the predominantly white, Protestant Republican base. However, the southern United States, often referred to as the “Solid South,” had been largely under the control of Democratic politicians since the Civil War. While these southern Democrats shared many views with their northern counterparts, they were generally more evangelical in their religious beliefs and less tolerant on racial issues. The federal structure of the United States allowed Democrats in other regions to forge alliances with minority groups. In contrast, African Americans in the South remained mostly disenfranchised well after Franklin Roosevelt had welcomed other demographics into the Democratic fold. This Democratic coalition functioned effectively during the 1930s and 1940s, a time when post-Depression politics focused on supporting farmers and aiding the unemployed. However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, social issues began to take center stage in national politics. Southern Democrats, who had previously supported granting the federal government authority for economic redistribution, started to oppose the use of those powers for social restructuring. Many of these Democrats left the party, finding a new home with Republicans, who promoted a smaller national government and greater states' rights. This transition was largely solidified with the rise of the evangelical movement in politics, which shifted its support from Jimmy Carter, an evangelical Christian, to Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election. Simultaneously, as social issues pushed the Solid South toward the Republican Party, they had an opposite effect in the North and West. Moderate Republicans, who had advocated for racial equality since Lincoln's era, collaborated with Democrats to achieve social reforms. As the party began to align more closely with the small government–states' rights movement, these moderate Republicans found it increasingly challenging to remain within their party. A notable example is Senator Arlen Specter, a moderate Republican from Pennsylvania, who ultimately switched to the Democratic Party before ending his political career.
Another factor contributing to heightened polarization is the influence of technology on public discourse. Before the 1950s, most people received their news through regional newspapers and local radio stations. While some national programming existed, local publishers and editorial boards held most editorial control, acting as filters to meet local market demands.
Television emerged as a significant medium, delivering consistent national news and editorial content that resonated across the United States. Audiences viewed the same footage of the women's rights movement and the Vietnam War. The rise of cable news and the merging of local news outlets into large corporate entities intensified this national perspective. Ordinary citizens could learn about Republican ideals from politicians in distant states just as easily as from local representatives, making it increasingly challenging for politicians to distance themselves from their voting records. The surge in information from cable, the Internet, and blogs has further driven this trend of nationalization.
The Gerrymandering Theory
The Gerrymandering Theory
Another contributing factor to polarization is the growing sophistication of gerrymandering, which involves the strategic manipulation of legislative districts to benefit specific candidates. The gerrymandering theory suggests that when voting districts are moderate or diverse, politicians tend to behave more moderately once in office. Taking extreme stances on numerous issues could jeopardize a politician's ability to build a broad electoral coalition. However, if a district is designed to favor a particular group, the elected official is inclined to cater only to the dominant portion of their constituency. Gerrymandering has existed for centuries, with legislative bodies often motivated to draw districts favorably for incumbents. Yet, advancements in law and technology have shifted gerrymandering from a rough practice to a more precise strategy. The first significant change occurred in 1962 when the U.S. Supreme Court established the "one-person-one-vote" principle. Prior to this, states typically redrew electoral maps only in response to gaining or losing seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, an event occurring every ten years during the constitutionally mandated reapportionment process, which adjusts House seats based on population shifts. Without changes in the number of seats, there was little reason to alter district boundaries. Legislators who had won elections based on existing maps were reluctant to risk losing seats by modifying them. Even when reapportionment resulted in new maps, many legislators prioritized the preservation of their own positions over increasing their party's overall representation. Consequently, some districts remained unchanged for decades, despite demographic shifts from rural to urban populations. By the early 1960s, certain electoral districts had populations significantly larger than those of their rural counterparts. In its Reynolds v. Simms (1964) decision, the Supreme Court asserted that every vote should carry approximately the same weight, regardless of geographic location. This necessitated adjustments to ensure districts had roughly equal populations. As a result, many states underwent significant alterations to their electoral maps in the subsequent redistricting cycles (1970–1972 and 1980–1982). Mapmakers, uncertain how to safeguard individual party members, adapted their strategies to create safe districts, aiming for a 55 percent or higher chance of victory for their preferred party, independent of the specific candidate nominated. Initially, many attempts at gerrymandering post-Reynolds were rudimentary, as map designers lacked accurate data on the distribution of political affiliations. They could only estimate voting trends across precincts, without insights into individual blocks or neighborhoods. Additionally, the inherent mobility of the U.S. population meant that even well-designed maps could become outdated within a few years. As a result, designers often resorted to simplistic indicators of party affiliation, such as race or neighborhood socio-economic status. Some maps were so poorly constructed that they were deemed unconstitutionally discriminatory by the courts.
Supporters of the gerrymandering theory argue that the reduction in moderate voters began during the era of heightened redistricting. They claim that the true impact became evident later. The introduction of computer-assisted map-making significantly advanced gerrymandering, transforming it into a precise science. With improved computing capabilities, the capacity to gather data on potential voters, and the application of sophisticated algorithms, mapmakers gained substantial confidence in determining district boundaries to influence electoral outcomes. These advancements also allowed for more accurate forecasts of future population changes, resulting in more stable long-term effects of gerrymandering. Advocates contend that this greater efficiency in drawing maps has led to the decline of moderate representation in Congress. Political scientist Nolan McCarty asserts that there is limited evidence to support the redistricting theory on its own. He notes that the Senate has become polarized just like the House of Representatives, yet senators are elected on a statewide basis without gerrymandered districts. However, research indicates that more partisan candidates often win House elections before successfully running for the Senate, which helps explain the Senate's partisanship. Additionally, states like Wyoming and Vermont, which have only one Representative and conduct statewide elections for the House, have consistently elected individuals at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. While redistricting has played a role in the polarization of the House, this effect has largely occurred in districts that have experienced significant change. Moreover, polarization is happening across the nation, even though the use of increasingly polarized district designs has not been uniformly adopted. Some states have seen a rise in these practices, yet many have historically been dominated by a single party, such as in the Solid South, while still electing moderate representatives. Certain regions remain closely contested between the two parties, complicating attempts at gerrymandering. Nevertheless, when combined with the sorting phenomenon previously mentioned, redistricting likely contributes to polarization, albeit marginally.
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