Is an isolationist America a bad thing?
What, I ask myself, would be worse for the world and for America? An isolationist America that retreats behind its oceans, disregarding global affairs and refusing to intervene, or an America that sees itself as a world policeman, exerting its power and intervening where necessary? Which of these two options is preferable: an America that intervenes or one that does not? This is the question I will attempt to answer, and it is not as straightforward as it may seem.
Before I start, I have to acknowledge that there is a third option. An America that doesn't so often intervene in world affairs but maintains the possibility that it could. A looming backstop. A power that, if exerted, would be terrible indeed. In many ways, that is the America of the last half-century, and that is the America that Europe is currently attempting to preserve
Today, we can witness America withdrawing from the world. Trump is said to be upending the postwar settlement, challenging everything we have understood about America's role in the world since the end of World War II. The "America First" policy seems to prioritize economic warfare, suggesting that what benefits America is best, regardless of the consequences for other countries. The sentiment appears to be: "We look after ourselves." Many commentators are suggesting that historic changes are taking place, and we should all be concerned and possibly fearful. After all, America has long been described as the defender and leader of the free world. If the defender and leader of the free world is packing up and going home, we should all be very worried.
Trump protectionism and tariffs: a threat to globalisation, or to democracy itself?
First, let’s clarify what we mean by American intervention in the world and consider American isolationism as well. American intervention, as I will define it today, really began at the end of World War II. Before I elaborate, some of you might immediately object in two ways. First, you might argue that all countries have exerted their power abroad whenever they deemed it necessary. The 19th-century British Empire, for instance, was famous for its gunboat diplomacy. Empires like the British, French, Portuguese, and Spanish were simply nations intervening beyond their borders to protect or assert their interests. However, I suggest that American intervention, in the sense we now fear may be ending, is different. It is not merely self-centered imperialism.
That doesn’t mean the United States does not also have a long history of imperialist intervention predating the Second World War. This intervention can be traced back to 1823, when the assertion was made that the Old World should refrain from interfering in the affairs of the New World, particularly regarding South and Central America, which were viewed as America's backyard. This principle, known as the Monroe Doctrine, guided American foreign policy throughout the 19th and into the 20th century. It exemplified traditional realpolitik, with America safeguarding its sphere of influence and asserting control over its region.
This doctrine was manifested in various American interventions in South American politics, affecting countries like Panama, Nicaragua, and Chile and extending through the Cold War. It was characterized by a pragmatic and often ruthless approach, encapsulated in the famous remark attributed to one of the Roosevelts: "He's a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch." This sentiment reflects the complexities of American imperialism, as seen in its support for dictators like Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza and Spain's Franco.
'Speak softly and carry a big stick'
Teddy Roosevelt proclaimed his 'big stick policy when intervening in Central America. During "Canal Diplomacy", the diplomatic actions of the U.S. during the pursuit of a canal across Central America.
The ironic consequences lie in the fact that just as the peoples who once lived in the British and French Empires, now contemplate moving to the cultural and political centres that once dominated them, and continue to enjoy the benefits of the economic endowments of empire, the peoples of South and Central America find themselves gravitating towards the USA. The imperialist nations, including the USA, presented themselves as having a civilising or at least protective mission. At the same time, while this was a façade adopted by late imperialism and concealed the brutal reality, it retains its cultural and economic gravity, which draws millions of migrants to the US border.
The realtionship the USA has had with Cetral and South Ameica has alway been imperialist. US corporate expansion in Mexico and Central America led to migration networks. Companies like Rosario Mining and United Fruit built "American Zones". These firms also implemented unequal labour practices, creating second-class citizens. Extractive industries seized resources from native lands. Oppression became common. People faced disappearances, torture, and murder. Civilians and farmers suffered greatly.
The second objection you might raise is regarding World War I. Indeed, during World War I, America sent a million soldiers abroad and played a decisive role in tipping the balance in favour of the Western allies. The war had settled into a stalemate, and American troops were crucial in shifting the tide. While it is difficult to say how long the war would have dragged on without American intervention, it is clear that it would have been significant.
Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States at the end of World War I, was the first president to leave the country during his term and travel to Europe for an extended period. His participation in the settlement of World War I, particularly the Versailles Treaty, was groundbreaking. Wilson aimed to bring to the world a political settlement of the kind that had worked so well for America. The United States had, contrary to most expectations, successfully constructed a nation from a continent. The idea that states that were the size of European countries could work together successfully seemed improbable. Yet, the Americans achieved this through the rule of law, a written constitution, and a legal process that was unique and precise. Wilson sought to apply this idea to the world, believing that if the disparate colonies of colonial America could be united, so too could the world, or at least Europe. He proposed legal processes and institutions to prevent the irrationality of war, which serves no one's best interest.
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However, the Europeans, while grateful for American intervention in World War I, had little desire to apply the principle of self-determination to their own empires. The Allies significantly diluted Wilson's grand vision of an end to war and international law and when he returned to America, the commitment to internationalism was seen as an open-ended obligation. The reaction led to a more isolationist sentiment in the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in the enactment of Isolation Acts that prevented American involvement in foreign wars.
Motivated by the same brand of idealism, Franklin Delano Roosevelt attempted to pick up the baton that Wilson had dropped, aiming to construct a system of laws and institutions to prevent future wars. Instead of the League of Nations, he established the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund and asserted recognizing the legal basis of human rights.
The World Trade Organization (WTO)
While international agreements and the beginning of international law date back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 or the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the scale and ambition of Roosevelt's post-World War II settlement were unprecedented. Firstly, before Wilsonian idealism, international law was still governed by ultimately transactional objectives. Lines were drawn on maps, rules of the game were defined and agreements of support were based on the mutual self-interest of nations as governments or dynasties. Wilsonianism asserted a broad vision of nations as comprising people, their culture, history, and rights, which pre-existed and superseded the narrow interests of power and wealth.
Second, the institutions established after World War II, proved effective and enduring. Even nations not inspired by Western liberalism, such as Russia and later China, sought to participate in them, recognizing a rational self-interest in peace and cooperation. This rules-based world, while idealistic, worked and persisted into the following decades. The Western allies were prompted to unity by the externalities of the Cold War and also by the haunting narrative of failed appeasement and isolationism. The new order must, therefore, be assertive and global.
Critics may argue with some justification that institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are neo-imperialist structures that favour industrialized nations and the UN, with its headquarters in New York and Geneva embodied western power. However, unlike the gunboat diplomacy of the British Empire, these institutions represented a commitment to policing the world based on idealism.
This bold enterprise was soon complicated by the Cold War. Roosevelt's belief that the Big Three—Britain, America, and Russia—would maintain their wartime alliance proved overly optimistic. The hostility of the Cold War undermined any real ambition that the world now had a global policeman.
Therefore in the post-war world, international law operated through the assertion of American power in pursuit of strategic objectives defined by the great game with the USSR. The Cold War redefined America's liberal idealism by conflating it with realism and the fight against communism. The objectives of the Cold War were seen as liberal and idealistic, with American soldiers sent to fight in places like Vietnam under the banner of protecting and extending the American Dream.
Throughout the Cold War, America asserted its power through institutions like the UN and military alliances like NATO, avoiding a retreat into isolationism. The famous NSC 68 document, which Truman committed to during the Korean War, ensured that America maintained a peacetime military capacity comparable to its wartime strength. This marked a significant shift in American military doctrine, as the nation prepared to fight multiple wars simultaneously.
America's role as the world's policeman, defender against communism, and promoter of the American Dream coincided with its unparalleled military power. The American military dwarfed all others, establishing the U.S. as the sole global superpower.
What, then, did America do with its power, and was it beneficial? America's military intervention in World War II was crucial, though the question of whether the Soviets could have defeated the Germans alone remains debated. The model of the Greatest Generation, with American troops fighting in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters, left America in a uniquely powerful position in the 1950s.
However, some historians question whether this power was ultimately beneficial, suggesting that a more pragmatic approach with the Russians might have been possible. The fear of communism and the idea of a domino effect may have intensified the Cold War, leading to a more dangerous global environment.
The legacy of the Vietnam War instilled a wariness in Americans towards open-ended conflicts, fostering a deep antipathy towards the loss of American soldiers abroad. This sentiment kept the United States from engaging in large-scale military commitments. From Nixon to Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, military actions were limited in scope, often confirming the potentially disastrous consequences of poorly conceived interventions. Notable incidents, such as the bombing of Marines in Lebanon during Reagan's administration and Clinton's infamous intervention in Somalia, exemplified these challenges, particularly highlighted by the Black Hawk Down incident.
The Vietnam experience taught Americans the importance of having clear objectives and a well-defined exit strategy. The ultimate limited war, fought by George H.W. Bush, aimed to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait and succeeded on its own terms. However, the subsequent shock of the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers dramatically altered American interventionist policies. This marked the emergence of a new American imperium, signaling a departure from isolation and led by hawkish neoliberalism. The U.S. sought to assert its power in the Middle East and Afghanistan, engaging in wars that were largely unconnected to the attacks in New York, with the intent of nation-building.
The invasion of Iraq ultimately proved disastrous for the United States and yielded mixed results for the Iraqi people. Similarly, the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated under Biden's administration, culminating in the Taliban's return to power. This costly endeavor resulted in the expenditure of a trillion dollars and the loss of many American, British, and other allied lives, alongside countless Afghan civilians caught in the crossfire.
As we consider the current situation in Ukraine, we must ask: What would Vladimir Putin do if not for the fear of American intervention and NATO? Would the world be safer if America withdrew from NATO? These questions remain critical as we navigate the complexities of international relations today.
The balance sheet of America's role as a global leader is quite mixed. Often seen as the world's policeman and a guardian of liberal idealism, the United States has also been a defender of the free world. However, this has led to some disastrous enterprises and significant loss of life. Historians have noted that liberal democracies tend to engage in wars with surprising brutality, exemplified by events such as the firebombing of Hanoi and the destruction of Hamburg and Dresden, as well as the use of atomic weapons and napalm during the Vietnam War. When wars are fought under the banner of democracy, liberation, or righteousness, they can justify an extraordinary level of violence. While this violence may not surpass that of imperialist wars or those led by dictators, it is nonetheless shocking for nations that profess commitment to individual human rights, the pursuit of happiness, and international law.
One underlying concept of post-World War II liberalism is often referred to as capitalist peace or market-led peace. The premise is that nations engaged in trade are less likely to go to war, as conflict would destroy their customer base. Institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now known as the World Trade Organization) were expected to foster world peace through economic integration. For instance, China's economic rise has been fueled by American consumers purchasing their goods, albeit at the cost of exploitation in Chinese sweatshops and the lives of millions of Asian workers producing inexpensive products for retailers like Walmart and Target. Thus, it seems illogical for these nations to engage in conflict.
However, the situation becomes more complex when considering Russia's actions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, had leaders like Yeltsin and Putin focused on development, infrastructure investment, and global trade, Russia could have enjoyed higher living standards. Putin's invasion of Ukraine defies rational liberal economic principles. Even if one views it as a traditional imperialistic endeavor for resources, the destruction and risks associated with war seem disproportionate to any potential gains from reclaiming Ukraine as part of the Russian Empire. The Russian military has been revealed as incompetent and corrupt, while NATO has strengthened and expanded. Ukrainians have developed a clearer national identity in their struggle against Russia, which they may not have had before. The Russian economy has suffered significantly, with long-term consequences from sanctions and a shift to a war economy that will manifest for years.
During Trump's first term, there was speculation about a potential U.S. withdrawal from NATO, which some argue is the most successful military alliance in history. This success is notable in the context of military alliances often leading to violent conflicts, as seen in the Thirty Years' War and World War I. Such alliances can create a false sense of security, making wars more devastating when they do occur. NATO appears to have bucked this trend, but questions remain about its effectiveness without U.S. involvement, especially in deterring Russia and possibly China. A diminished NATO, still comprising nuclear powers like France and the UK, may not be sufficient to maintain stability.
Ultimately, if America's interventions have been characterized by blundering and violence with mixed results, it is not clear whether a world without U.S. engagement would be more dangerous.