Is war with China inevitable?

Is China a Super Power? 

In his 2017 book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, Harvard Professor Graham Allison analysed 500 years of world history, and identified 16 cases where a rising power has threatened to displace a major ruling power. He found that 12 of these 16 potential conflicts ultimately resulted in war.

Based on various international relations theories, Allison argues that a war between China and the US is inevitable unless China slows its challenge to American hegemony 

Implications of interdependence. The key reason why China’s rise has been, and will continue to be, peaceful is that it is taking place within an international system shaped by globalization. Globalization reduces the incidence of war in two main ways. First, rising states such as China no longer need to make economic gains by conquest because globalization offers a cheaper and easier route to national prosperity, in the form of trade. Second, by significantly increasing levels of economic interdependence, globalization makes a Chinese recourse to war almost unthinkable. This is because of the economic costs that war would involve – destroyed trade partnerships, lost external investment, and so on.

Capitalist peace theory 

 ‘Soft’ balancing. Neorealist theorists argue that, confronted by a rising or major power, other states will tend to ‘balance’ (oppose or challenge that power for fear of leaving itself exposed), rather than ‘bandwagon’ (side with that power; that is, ‘jump on the bandwagon’). However, China’s inclination to ‘balance’ against the USA will be confined to the adoption of ‘soft’ (non-military) balancing strategies, because the latter’s huge military dominance is unlikely to be abandoned in the near future. Similarly, the likelihood that the USA will adopt ‘hard’ (military) balancing strategies against China has greatly reduced due to the difficulties it experienced in waging the ‘war on terror’.

Has America given up on global dominance?  

Sino–US bipolar stability. As the twenty-first century progresses, world order may be reshaped on a bipolar, rather than multipolar, basis. The military, economic and structural strengths of the USA are not going to fade soon, and China, already an economic superpower, is clearly not merely one of ‘the rest’. Sino–US relations may, as a result, come to replicate US–USSR relations during the ‘long peace’ of the Cold War period. In other words, bipolarity will, once again, prove to be the surest way of preventing rivalry and hostility spilling over into aggression, as it provides the most favourable conditions for a stable balance of power. 

Multipolar instabilities. China’s rise is part of a wider restructuring of world order, in which global power is being distributed more widely. Neorealists argue that such multipolarity creates conditions that are inherently prone to conflict and instability, making it increasingly unlikely that China will maintain its ‘peaceful rise’. As multipolarity favours fluidity and uncertainty, shifting alliances and power imbalances, it creates opportunities (just as in the run-up to World War I and World War II) for ambitious states to make a bid for power through conquest and expansion. As states seek to maximize power, and not merely security, such circumstances make great powers prone to indiscipline and risk-taking (Mearsheimer, 2001). 

 International anarchy and its implications 

The creation of AUKUS as a reaction to China and BRICS

Cultural and ideological rivalry. Sino–US bipolarity may pose a greater threat to global peace than did Cold War bipolarity. Whereas antagonism between the USA and the USSR was primarily ideological in character, in the case of ‘liberal-democratic’ USA and ‘Confucian’ China ideological differences are rooted in deeper cultural divisions. These may provide the basis for growing enmity and misunderstanding, in line with the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. The transfer of hegemony from the British Empire in the nineteenth century to the USA in the twentieth century may, thus, have remained peaceful only because of cultural similarities that allowed the UK to view the ‘rising’ USA as essentially unthreatening.

Case study: The US limits China's access to chip technology

False Optimism:Wars start for many reasons, but they all stem from one key problem: misplaced hope. They break out when both sides feel sure they can force their goals through strength—that is, when each thinks victory is theirs. True wins for both are rare. So, one side, or usually both, badly misjudges the foe's power. In essence, close or unclear power setups in the military spark fights. Any shift that tightens or muddies those setups—like fresh tech or a big arms push by the underdog—raises the chance of conflict. 

 Case study War in Ukraine 

Flashpoints. There are various flashpoints that have the potential to turn tension and hostility into aggression. Chief amongst these is Taiwan, where US support for an independent and ‘pro-western’ Taiwan clashes with China's quest to incorporate Taiwan into ‘greater China’ (Carpenter, 2006). Other issues that may inflame Sino–US relations include Tibet, where Beijing’s policy of aggressive ‘Sinofication’ conflicts with Washington’s unofficial support for Tibetan independence; human rights generally, but especially China’s treatment of ‘pro-democracy’ dissidents; and the future of disputed islands in the East and South China Seas. Many U.S. officials believe the risk of war is rising. CIA Director William Burns has said Xi seeks the capability to take Taiwan by 2027. And as China’s economy struggles, some observers—including, reportedly, U.S. intelligence analysts—are looking for signs that a peaking China might turn aggressive in order to distract attention from internal problems or to lock in gains while it still can. 

Case Study: Taiwan

Authoritarian leaders are more likely to fight wars. Leaders in cult of personality dictatorships start wars over twice as often as those in democracies or shared-power autocracies. These dictators risk less from fights. In the last century, they lost power only 30% of the time after defeats. Other leaders faced removal or votes out nearly every time they lost. Dictators turn extreme due to yes-men who scramble to please them. They also build foreign foes, real or not, since fierce nationalism excuses harsh control inside borders. Leaders in restricted systems govern with care and slip away quietly. Dictators, like Adolf Hitler in Germany, Benito Mussolini in Italy, Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong in China, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Vladimir Putin in Russia, carve their names in history through mass killings.