Embedded Files
The Politics Shed- A Free Text Book for all students of Politics.
On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. One theory that seeks to explain Putin’s actions stems from the school of offensive realism in International Relations (IR), which holds that states are aggressive power maximisers trying to extinguish any threats to their security. Promoting this approach, Professor John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) claimed at a recent talk at the EUI that Russia had no choice but to invade Ukraine. The neighbouring country presented an existential threat to Russia because of its Western ties.
The world’s leading “realist” scholar of international relations, which argues that a state’s priority is being more powerful relative to its neighbours to ensure its survival, Mearsheimer had been warning of a possible Russian attack on Ukraine since the 1990s. In one essay, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” (1993), he wrote that the West’s attempt to press Ukraine to become a non-nuclear state was a huge mistake.
Liberal commentators contend that the Russo-Ukrainian War was an act of unprovoked aggression that can be explained solely by reference to pathologies with the Russian state, elite, and/or society rather than a response to a perceived external threat from the West.
Prof Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, gave a lecture 2023- at the EUI's Robert Schuman Centre, argues that Russia had no other choice but to attack Ukraine following aggressive behaviour by the United States and Europe, driving Ukraine, Georgia and other countries on the Eastern flank towards NATO and EU membership.
The war also illustrates another classic realist concept: the idea of a “security dilemma.” The dilemma arises because the steps that one state takes to make itself more secure often make others less secure. State A feels unsafe and seek any ally or buys some more weapons; State B gets alarmed by this step and responds in kind, suspicions deepen, and both countries end up poorer and less safe than they were before. It made perfect sense that states in Eastern Europe wanted to get into NATO (or as close to it as possible), given their long-term concerns about Russia. But it should also be easy to understand why Russian leaders—and not just Putin—regarded this development as alarming.
The war is also evidence of the failure of institutions and the theory of interdependence international law and international institutions have proved to be a weak barrier to rapacious great-power behavior. Economic interdependence did not stop Moscow from launching its invasion, despite the considerable costs that it will face as a result. Soft power couldn’t stop Russia’s tanks, and the U.N. General Assembly’s lopsided 141-5 vote (with 35 abstentions) condemning the invasion won’t have much impact either. The war has demolished the belief that war was no longer “thinkable” in Europe
Russia, Ukraine and NATO
Russia, Ukraine and NATO
In 2008, NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would join eventually. Later that year Russia invaded Georgia, taking control over about a fifth of its territory.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian leadership, including Vladimir Putin, has viewed NATO expansion, especially into former Soviet territory, as a threat to Russia's security and national interests.
In late 2013 mass protests started in Ukraine after President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the EU, which he initially supported.
As a result, Yanukovych fled Ukraine to Russia, amendments to the constitution weakening the authority of the president were restored and the central government was replaced.
Russia responded by taking over the Crimean Peninsula in southern Ukraine, which hosted the Russian Navy’s Black Sea fleet.
Following the annexation of Crimea, a civil war began in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian government, pushing Ukraine closer to NATO.
After a series of agreements failing, in 2021 Russia posed a series of radical demands, which included stopping most NATO activity in Poland and the Baltic states, as well as formal agreements that Ukraine and Georgia would never join NATO.
With these demands not met, Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
Russia hoped to overthrow the Ukrainian government quickly but failed, which resulted in a long war with hundreds of thousands of casualties and Russia occupying around 20% of Ukrainian territory.
In response, most NATO countries imposed sanctions on Russia while also providing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of military and economic support to Ukraine.
This has led to the conflict being called a proxy war between NATO and Russia.
As the world anticipates a potential peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine, a key area of conflict remains whether Ukraine would join NATO, and what security guarantees it would receive from the West and other countries.
'I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the nato Summit in Bucharest, where afterward nato issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of nato. The Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Of course, this includes more than just nato expansion. nato expansion is the heart of the strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, and, from a Russian perspective, this is an existential threat.'
Professor John Mearsheimer
The journalist Anne Applebaum accused Mearsheimer of being Putin’s useful idiot, tweeting that his article had given the Kremlin its talking points for the war.
“John simply can’t explain Russian behaviour because he is too focused on the international system and ignores the domestic forces at play. He suggests that Ukraine was about to join Nato, but it wasn’t, and he seems to find it reasonable to deny Ukraine the right to chart its own course. He also can’t detect Russia’s colonial attitudes towards Ukraine. I would consider myself a realist, but it is a realism based on assessing the situation as you find it rather than how you wish it to be based on some dogmatic theory.”
Lawrence Freedman
Analyzing the invasion of Ukraine from a liberal standpoint that stresses democratic principles, international law, and human rights, Russia's actions are considered indefensible and morally wrong. However, there are realist arguments that can elucidate Russia's motives for the invasion of Ukraine: security concerns and geographical vulnerabilities, the desire to reclaim a sphere of influence, adoption of an offensive realist strategy, opposition to the liberal international order led by the U.S., diversionary war theory, and concerns regarding autocratic stability and domestic politics.
The Realist Rationale for Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Russia's invasion of Ukraine suggests a strategic pursuit of enhancing its economic and military power to establish regional dominance. Putin aims to expand Russia's influence over former Soviet republics such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine, leveraging perceived weaknesses in the West to redraw boundaries in Europe.
Realists associate Russia's invasion with revisionism against the U.S.-led liberal international order established post-Cold War. Russia has long expressed concerns about NATO encirclement and perceived disrespect towards its interests in Ukraine and its sphere of influence. Realists argue that despite the Soviet Union's collapse, the U.S. and allies' expansions have threatened Russia's core interests, making it feel confined by NATO's eastward expansion.
Another realist perspective on Russia's invasion sees it as a diversionary tactic, where leaders incite external conflict to shift focus from internal issues. Russian leaders have a history of using military action abroad to address domestic problems, as seen in events like Stalin's invasion of Finland in 1939 and Putin's involvement in conflicts such as Chechnya and the 2008 invasion of Georgia. In 2022, Putin was confronted with various domestic challenges, including economic difficulties, widespread corruption, income inequality, and the potential for further anti-government demonstrations akin to those in 2020 and early 2022.
Another relevant explanation from the realist perspective, originating in Russia's internal politics, is the concept of autocratic insecurity. This theory suggests that authoritarian leaders like Putin fear that any compromise or display of weakness could threaten the survival of their regime. This theory is in line with the defensive realist approach, where nations will take preemptive and firm actions when their core interests and survival are at stake. In this context, Putin viewed the events in Ukraine in 2022 as a direct threat to the survival and legitimacy of his regime, particularly due to Russia's claims to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine. The fear of losing influence in Ukraine could spark nationalist opposition within Russia and damage Putin's carefully crafted strongman image. Putin's actions are driven by deep-seated concerns that failing to regain control over historically significant territories could weaken his regime and diminish Russia's standing as a major power. The autocratic insecurity theory posits that Putin believed escalating the situation in Ukraine was necessary to ensure his political survival and maintain Russia's position as a significant global power.
Page updated
Google Sites
Report abuse