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In 1972, President Richard Nixon became the first US president to visit the People’s Republic of China. His meeting with Chairman Mao provided the initial foundation for China’s decision to develop trade with the rest of the world. The consequences of this for China’s seismic economic growth have been profound. In 1994, the year he died, Nixon presciently warned that: 'Today, China’s economic power makes US lectures about human rights imprudent. Within a decade it will make them irrelevant. Within two decades it will make them laughable.'
China’s economic outreach is certainly global. For almost 30 years, China’s annual growth rate has been between 8% and 10%, though this has slowed down in recent years to around 6% in 2019. China’s state-run capitalist model weathered the global financial crisis in 2008 significantly better than the models of Western powers and, by 2010, the Chinese economy was 90 times greater than it had been in 1978.
With the world’s largest population (1.45 billion in 2021), China has massive reserves of cheap labour, making it the manufacturing and export heart of the world.
China has also demonstrated its growing power with the Belt and Road Initiative , a massive infrastructure initiative that will invest in over 70 countries and international organisations. Similarly, the so-called ‘String of Pearls’ initiative (the concept of China building a network of commercial and military bases in ports across many countries, which has been seen as a particular threat to India) has demonstrated China’s expanding geopolitical influence. It is anticipated that the global pandemic will significantly slow down China’s growth, however it seems unlikely this will disproportionately impact China.
Although still considered to be a developing nation (due to the levels of poverty and the lack of development in significant parts of the country, especially in rural areas), China has also become the most successful neocolonial power in the world. It is Africa’s biggest trading partner and the value of China–Africa trade in 2019 was $192 billion, up from $185 billion in 2018. In defiance of the Monroe Doctrine, which regards South America as firmly within the US’s sphere of influence, China has dramatically increased investment in the region. From 2000 to 2013, trade between China and South America increased 22 times. China is now the second-largest trading partner of Latin America (the US is the largest). President Xi Jinping has made numerous visits to the continent in order to further develop economic and diplomatic ties. Chinese investments are also global. Chinese investors own Birmingham City Football Club, House of Fraser, Pizza Express, Volvo and Weetabix. A Chinese investment of £6 billion is financing the proposed Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor in Somerset. Chinese investors are also financing the Nicaragua Canal, which will cost US $50 billion and is designed to challenge the Panama Canal. China’s structural economic power is dramatically increasing, further extending its global outreach. Since 2001, China has been a member of the WTO and, in 2015, Beijing established the AIIB, which provides loans to developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region. China also heavily invests in the US in the form of foreign direct investment. This demonstrates how China has grown, given that it used to rely on foreign direct investment from the West.
In 2019, the Chinese government reported an official defence budget of just under $178 billion, however other estimates are higher. This is second only to the US. China has purchased an aircraft carrier from Ukraine and completed construction of its own in 2017, with another completed in 2021. It is also attempting to militarise reefs in the South China Sea and is building up its submarine and missile capability in the region. In 2014, for example, China deployed the Jin-class ballistic missile submarine in the South China Sea. Each submarine is armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear missiles.
In 2019, the Chinese government reported an official defence budget of just under $178 billion, however other estimates are higher. This is second only to the US. China has purchased an aircraft carrier from Ukraine and completed construction of its own in 2017, with another completed in 2021. It is also attempting to militarise reefs in the South China Sea and is building up its submarine and missile capability in the region. In 2014, for example, China deployed the Jin-class ballistic missile submarine in the South China Sea. Each submarine is armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear missiles.
However, these developments do not confirm that China is close to becoming a superpower. Some critics have likened China at the beginning of the twenty-first century to Prussia at the end of the nineteenth century. In short, China is great and powerful in its ‘near abroad’. However, its military and diplomatic outreach does not match its economic outreach. The US, for example, has almost 800 military bases in 70 countries as well as alliances across the globe. Only in 2016 did China open its first overseas military base, at Djibouti in the Indian Ocean.
China’s global influence is also arguably limited by its communist ideology. American democratic values have, especially since the Second World War, had a global appeal, which China’s more authoritarian approach lacks. In its immediate zone of influence, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan all look to the US for both ideology and protection, therefore affecting its soft power on a local and a global scale. ASEAN also provides an alternative model of development. India, as the world’s largest democracy, represents a potential barrier to China’s global influence. Even Russia, which is increasingly authoritarian and understands the value of courting China, shares a 4,000 km disputed border with China, making its friendship unreliable.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under President Xi Jinping’s administration appears to have abandoned former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s policies of rule by consensus and a large degree of economic freedom crucial to creating a modern and advanced society.
Crackdowns on hyper-rich Chinese businessmen; strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology; the crushing of dissent, whether in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, or internally; and the purging of political rivals are not signs of a healthy political system, especially when innovation is dependent upon entrepreneurship.
In addition, China still has issues with its human rights record, which has come under heavy criticism from the international community, once more affecting its soft power. A recent example of this has been the claim that China has been committing a crime against humanity and possibly genocide against the Uighur Muslim population in the Xinjiang region. China denies these allegations and claims it is trying to combat separatism and extremism in the region.
There is also the question of whether China actually wants to be a superpower. In order to be a superpower a nation-state needs to have a clear world mission and be willing to take on a global leadership role. Rome in the ancient world had this sense of mission, as did Great Britain in the nineteenth century, and in recent years so has the US. However, China has generally viewed world affairs according to Westphalian principles, by not seeking to impose its values on other states and jealously protecting its sovereignty from outside influence. In 2015, President Xi Jinping announced at a military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War that, ‘China will remain committed to peaceful development. We Chinese love peace. No matter how much stronger it may become, China will never seek hegemony or expansion.’ However, China’s more recent geopolitical actions have suggested a shift in this behaviour, and it could now be argued that China is at least vying for regional hegemony. After all, there has seemingly been a global move towards regional hegemony as opposed to global hegemony, and we have seen similar in the middle east with Saudi Arabia and Iran’s battle for dominance in the Arab world. Other signs point to China’s ambitions being even greater: the Belt and Road Initiative and the String of Pearls concept suggest an increasingly global range of influence. In 2017, in the wake of President Trump’s abandonment of the Paris treaty, China quickly positioned itself as the global leader on climate change.
September 2025 Xi Jinping has presided over China’s largest-ever military parade, orchestrated to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the second world war, which China calls the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Dozens of world leaders – mostly from non-western nations – attended the event. Still, it was the grand entrance of Xi Jinping accompanied by Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korean Kim Jong-un. n his opening address Xi said the world was facing “a choice between peace and war”, warning that China was a great nation that “is never intimidated by any bullies”, a likely veiled reference to the US and its allies. He said the past showed that Chinese people always rallied together “to defy the enemy” when faced with adversity.
The 70-minute parade displayed a huge amount of military hardware. From tanks and drones to long-range and nuclear-capable missiles, fighter jets and stealth aircraft
It's the first time ever that Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-Un and Xi Jinping have met in public together - Donald Trump, though, has not been invited to join the festivities in Beijing, offering an alternative to the US-led world order as China fills the vacuum left by America's withdrawal from international norms.
However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was not present at President Xi’s parade, despite sharing the stage with China's leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin just two days erlier. Their warm exchanges went viral on social media in what some saw as the start of a new world order that doesn’t rely on Washington. It is likely that Modi is unwilling to be seen in the company of so many criminals
Trump's unimpressive parade, or maybe more impressive since it lacked the comic vulgarity of China's, instead, it reaffirmed the values of a middle America town parade, not, however, what Trump wanted.
The guest list was an unimpressive gallery of corrupt authoritarians, minor states, and criminal dictators largely bound together by fear, necessity (Russia/ N Korea), and self-interest.
The parade did not mark the transfer of unipolar dominance from Washington to Beijing. Rather, it highlighted how China seeks to consolidate its position as a central pole in a world that is already multipolar.
Amitav Acharya, professor of international relations at American University, in “The End of American World Order” — regional powers, great powers, and superpowers. The United States after 1945 reached the level of a superpower not simply because of its vast economy but because economic power was combined with military might, technological superiority, political legitimacy, and a dense alliance system. It had the dollar as a convertible global currency, forward basing across multiple continents, and an architecture of institutions that embedded its primacy. America’s rise was comprehensive. China may reach this level of comprehensive power but it is not there yet.
“There's quite a lot of evidence now that the US is preparing to change its big strategic idea…this idea that China was the big challenge.”
Leaks from the National Security Strategy suggest Trump is “about to abandon” the containment of China and prioritise homeland security, says The Sunday Times’s Mark Urban.