Case Study: Why did Trump win in 2024?

Why did Trump win? (again)

Historians and political scientists attempted to answer this in 2016 and many of their hypothesis still apply. Still, this time it seems even more baffling since in 2016 Trump was a relatively unknown quantity, at least in the sense of how he might turn out as president. He had no executive or legislative experience in the traditional fields of vice presidential office, governorship, army command, or Congress. In another sense, of course he was very well known, as a celebrity and the presiding star of the hit TV show The Apprentice. In most election cycles the candidate and potential candidates struggle to make much impression on  popular consciousness until well into the election year and generally after the party conventions. In  June of 2008 most Americans could not identify a picture of Barak Obama four months before he won the election, with Trump this has always been very different. Trump was the first media made celebrity to run for the presidency- not withstanding Reagan’s B movies and role as front man for Lucky Strike cigarettes. Reagan’s principle qualification was still his two terms as governor of California. Trump was in another league of celebrity one which had been projected into the minds of the majority of Americans by television and magnified to a level of  celebrity and familiarity way beyond the reach of all the members of Congress, four star generals and residents of governor’s mansions. In 2016 and in 2024 his  celebrity status outshone his Republican rivals and placed him front and centre in the mind of any American who had not been off planet for the last decade.

In 2016, while his celebrity status was clear, whether he could manifest the character he played on the Apprentice in the role of president, was uncertain. Would he wield the same decisive energy and display the same managerial acumen?  Looking back at his first tenure as president no objective observer could say that he exhibited any of the commanding features which were so apparent in the fictional world of reality television. The Apprentice was a fiction, as was his ghost written best seller the Art of the Deal where Trump described his mastery of deal making. Trump’s career is a catalogue of failed businesses, tax avoidance and downright illegality and Trump’s first four years displayed his incompetence for all to see. Trump’s pettiness, vanity, misogyny, racism, inconsistency, spitefulness and limited grasp of world affairs were witnessed, attested to and documented by the multiple sacked appointees, journalists and writers[1] who had a front row view of Trump’s presidency in action. Trump’s first Secretary of State Rex Tillerson openly referred to President Donald Trump as “a moron”[2] .

While the pandemic, which as the great crisis of his first term, offered an opportunity, as all great crisis do, for the chief executive to wield decisive power, instead it exposed his failing on a broad and tragic stage. Not only did Trump not rise to the challenge of the pandemic, he mishandled, bungled and delayed the response, which resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands. The intervening years allowed for these failings to be reflected  on and fully exposed with no redeeming interpretations gaining serious traction. According to an extensive list of historians and experts in American political history, Trump was undoubtedly the worst president America had ever had.[3] If anything more was needed to cast Trump into the political wilderness the slowly turning wheels of justice produced accusations, prosecutions, and convictions for crimes form sexual assault, defamation, election interference, larceny of state secrets and insurrection. Trump was a convicted felon facing multiple charges.   So again you might ask, how on earth has he been re-elected?

Elected again he has been, and with a more substantial victory than in 2016. This explanation will begin with  a long view of the Trump phenomenon.  So let’s start with democracy and why we shouldn’t be surprised.

1.Why Trump won (again) democracy and why we shouldn’t be surprised.

If Trump’s re-election can be explained as a consequence of popular democracy, it may also be the result of a  constitutional failure, which is more specific to the United States. The often-made observation that the Constitution of 1789 began the ‘American experiment’ probably began with doubts of James Madison and the remark by Benjamin Franklin that they had made ‘A republic if you can keep it.’ Franklin and Madison were  well aware that their compromises would be tested and the Constitution would need to face and survive serious crises as it has evolved and adapted over time. While Trump’s presidency presents another test of the Constitution’s durability, his election and re-election result from an ongoing crisis that he did not initiate.

While the designers of the constitution were pessimistic about the sagacity of the people they nonetheless created a system which thethe depended two fragile necessities, first was compromise and second that politicians should put the interests of the nation before the interests of party or faction. These necessities have become more apparent as  the Constitution's development has shown a continued progression toward more inclusive democracy. However, almost immediately after the ratification of the constitution the hope of non-partisan politics  failed to materialise, but the necessity for compromise survived, just. One reason for the continued presence of compromise in American politics was the nature of American parties. Unlike European parties they were loose coalitions which only took on a national identity every four years.  This structural flexibility and ideological plurality within parties allowed some degree of pragmatism and compromise to continue. Not withstanding the failure of compromise which led to the civil war, it is generally true that bipartisanship and willingness to compromise remained a feature of American politics.  What has this history lesson got to do with Trump? The answer might be that as compromise has declined as a feature of American politics and parties have become more polarised and Congress more dysfunctional there has been a consequential loss of faith in the old order and desire for change which neither party could satisfy.  According to this hypothesis, it was this constitutional failure which produced Trump.

Kirby Goidel, a professor in the Department of Political Science at The Bush School of Government and Public Service believes Trump’s victory means there should be a re-evaluation of the constitution.  “Going forward, we are going to have to seriously rethink the Madisonian design. Other political systems, based on proportional representation and with parliamentary systems, appear to be functioning more effectively[6]. Our system encourages politicians to take visible stands while playing to their base constituencies, but doesn’t reward them for actually solving problems.’’ This frustration at ‘do-nothing’ congresses, repeated government shutdowns and the atmosphere of partisan viciousness extends beyond the ‘broken branch’ of Congress to the wider political establishment. The influence of money, corruption scandals, the influence of corporations, gerrymandered elections gives credence to Trump’s call to ‘drain the swamp’ and makes a young man, Luigi Mangione, hero for murdering a corporate health care executive.

Is Trump therefore a manifestation of discontent, on the premise that content societies do not produce politicians like Trump? Since politicians like Trump have become more common across the world, this explanation points to broader discontents. While confidence in stability and progress towards greater prosperity and equality has seemed less certain from the late 19th Century, in  the last few decades reason for pessimism have grown. From the expiry of any residual post-Cold War optimism that an era of peace might ensue, to the inequity of globalisation and huge disparities of wealth across the world and within nations, with the resulting increase in migration and destruction of traditional working class communities. Add an increasing awareness of the environmental catastrophe which is unfolding before our eyes[7] and if you like, the consequences of late consumer capitalism and its necessity to maintain consumption through the production of discontent and distraction[8]. Many analysts have pointed to a crisis of capitalism, a crisis of liberal democracy[9] and an age of anxiety[10]. Recently  climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, international instability, and the cost of living crisis are the  backdrop to our lives  and social media  as well as and a constant news cycle means that we constantly made aware of impending threats, both real and imagined. Certainly the idea that liberal democracy was an inevitable consequence of economic development has become altogether less certain[11].

It is therefore unsurprising that this uncertainty should be reflect in politics. The last few years have certainly been a bad time for incumbents- or at least incumbents seeking high office. Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election was just the latest in a long line of losses for incumbent parties in 2024, with people in some 70 countries accounting for about half the world’s population going to the polls. “There’s an overall sense of frustration with political elites, viewing them as out of touch, that cuts across ideological lines,” said Richard Wike, director of global attitudes research at the Pew Research Centre. The Conservatives in the UK, the French National Assembly and the rapid decline of Macron’s party, in Germany  the collapse of Olaf Scholz’s coalition means that Germany will have no functioning government when Donald Trump assumes office in January. In Asia, a group of South Korean liberal opposition parties, led by the Democratic Party, defeated the ruling conservative People Power Party in April’s parliamentary elections.

India’s Narendra Modi, meanwhile, had been widely expected to easily sweep to a third straight term in June 2024 but instead voters turned away from his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in droves, costing it its majority in parliament, though it was able to remain in power with the help of allies. Likewise, Japanese voters in October punished the Liberal Democratic Party, which has governed the country nearly without interruption since 1955. Since the pandemic hit in 2020, incumbents have been removed from office in 40 of 54 elections in Western democracies, said Steven Levitsky, a political scientist at Harvard University, revealing “a huge incumbent disadvantage.”[12]

This era of discontent and frustration with politics as usual might also explain the rise of populist politics[13], which have genearlly appeared in history at times of discontent, uncertainty and fear.[14] Periods  marked by wars, terrorist threats, economic struggles, political gridlock, cultural conflicts, and falling incomes which weaken trust in the political system, creating an opening for candidates like Trump. Trump’s campaign was unusual in that it attacked the  pillars of its democracy, the press, the courts and the peaceful transfer of power and the rule of law charactering the whole system as ‘the swamp’ and in this characterisation millions of Americans saw their own view of a do nothing Congresses, lobbying scandals, corporate greed, which coalesced into a brood ill-defined rejection of politics as usual. Trump’s aggression and alarmism contributed to his outsider status even when running for re-election. He was able to personify  a break with the usual and in many ways Biden’s political longevity made him an avatar for business as usual.

For years, many Americans have expressed to pollsters that they think the country is heading in the wrong direction. Public trust in all of the institutions of the republic has steadily declined.[15] A huge majority of Americans think Congress is a den of self-serving, crooks and liars. The presidency has precious little capacity to unify the nation with honeymoons barely outlasting the inauguration and approval ratings dropping away like  the medical chart of patient in their final desperate stage of life.[16] The Supreme court is seen as hopelessly politicised, partisan and corrupt, a view borne out by decisions of dubious legality and pronounced ideology as well as by egregious  perks and personal political connections.[17] So how surprised should we be when millions of Americans want to vote for anti-politics in human form?

Populism and anti-politics are a global phenomenon. Between 1990 and 2018, the number of populists in power around the world has increased  fivefold, from four to 20.[18] Trump shares the characteristic populist assertion that the "true people" are in conflict with outsiders.  The country's powerful leaders form a corrupt group that does not truly care about ordinary people or the public good. This is why anti-establishment politics is a key part of his populism.  Accordingly Trump suggested that entire agencies should be abolished and  tens of thousands of federal workers should be fired and  that the FBI should itself be investigated. This was anti-establishment politics and it resonated with millions.

Another strand of populism which reflected a change in the political climate was anti-globalisation. In the first decades of this century anti-globalisation was dominated by the left and the politics of ecologism. Globalisation had created a free fire zone for global capitalism, fostering global debt and environmental despoliation. Anti-globalisation sentiments have since morphed into a populist revival of neo-mercantilism[19], where the interests of the nation state represent the interests of the ‘people’. It came with the concurrent baggage of isolationism where walls, actual or in the form of tariffs, provided a reassuring distance between the world and us.[20] This form of populist anti-globalisation looks to protectionism and is rooted in anger at the harsh disparities which globalisation inflicted on mature economies rather than on developing nations, which had been the focus of the left. The uneven effect of globalisation and the political consequences were described in  The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics by David Goodhart who contrasts those who welcomed and benefitted from globalisation, who he labelled the ‘anywhere people’ with those who were threatened by it, as it eroded their communities and way of life, these were the ‘somewhere people’. Although this is a form of retro-sentimentalism where the somewhere people are located in an America of the 1950s, a golden age which was destroyed by the ‘everywhere people’ characterised as the metropolitan liberal elites. It’s a simplistic picture which ignores the ultraism and idealism of internationalists as much as the  deep desire to put down roots and find a ‘somewhere’ which is the profound desire of immigrants throughout history. However, the consequences of the decline of manufacturing, the export of jobs and import of goods was a harsh reality particularly for rural and rustbelt America. It was this reality which gave the imaginary its political force and visa-versa. All that was needed was a standard around which this narrative could gather, by luck or judgement Trump supplied it- ‘Make America Great Again’.

The populist themes of  retro sentimentalism and the fantasy ‘othering’ of external threats grew out of  two very significant forms of inequality which have emerged in this century, in sharp contrast to the later half of the last century, these are  inequality of opportunity and wealth inequality. The decades following World War Two, contrast with our current times in  greater social mobility and  narrower wealth distribution. The difference is significant and its political consequence is Trump.

Generally people will tolerate high levels of wealth inequality if they feel that there is a reasonable degree of social mobility. However social mobility for most people does not mean becoming super rich, but is instead faith in the fairness of access to secure, rewarding employment[21]. People resent cheating, nepotism and unearned privilege most acutely when it discriminates against them or their children. In other words people are not resentful of Musk or Bezos,[22] but they deeply resent queue jumping and or being excluded as it applies to them and people like them. This might explain why despite the ever-growing economic gap between the very wealthy and the rest of the population, support for redistributive policies tends to be low,[23] but resentment of illegal immigration or undeserving welfare claimants is high.[24] This has always been one of the great strengths of American society, the acceptance of the huge disparities in wealth distribution as long as there was a realist possibility of enjoying some portion of it through a fair distribution of luck or hard work. These  are termed ‘system-justifying beliefs’.[25] As long as each generation could say ‘I am better off than my parents’ the momentum suggested a degree of social justice which might at the very least, articulate itself across generations. For most Americans the means of expressing this belief was through hard work which should be rewarded by some measurable if incremental material progress. It is the widespread loss of confidence in work as the instrument of social mobility which is another contributing factor to the rise of Trump.

System-justifying beliefs lie at the heart of most education systems. These beliefs  serve to foster social cohesion well, is to convince millions of people that  the path it provides to social progression means they live in something like a meritocracy[26] or at least a society where there is a reasonable expectation that  merit  will be rewarded. Most education systems are at pains to assure students of the correctness of this belief which is perpetuated through the strap lines of schools the optimism of teachers and the systems of competition such as exams, test and grades, which serve to reassure the winners of their rightful success and the losers of their deserving status. The widespread loss of faith in education as the great equaliser is another factor in the appeal of Trumpism not however because education is no longer a path to economic security but because it has become a sharply discriminating arbiter of success. Increasingly American education has become mechanism for dividing American society rather than gluing it together. As a result  education has become a better predictor of voting intention in the USA than class, ethnicity or religion. This is the opportunity gap and it divides Americans. It began with the fragmentation of the blue collar working class , particularly in rural areas, in the 1970’s with deindustrialisation  and the progressive deskilling  of the service jobs which relaced manufacturing- think what working as a shop assistant was once like and what it involved, contact with customers, sales skills, numeracy. Now the retail worker is likely to be a silent acolyte of the shelves, filling and counting or wafting items across the bar code reader with no need to greet or accept payment, the whole process a succession of bleeps. For the non-college educated the economy they inhabit is characterised by low pay, insecurity and low skill.

The non college educated have also suffered a material decline in living standards. In October 2024 a report on growing income inequality in the US, by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis found that for every dollar of wealth in a household headed by a college graduate, a household headed by a high school graduate has 22 cents. This rises to 30 cents for households headed by someone with some college, but no degree. In the second quarter of 2024, households headed by a college graduate owned the disproportionately highest share of total family wealth. They owned 74.4% of total family wealth despite making up only 41% of households, an advantage of 81% greater wealth than we might expect based on their household representation.[27] In the 2024 election  the ‘diploma gap’ widened,  Kamala Harris fared worse than Joe Biden in 2020 among voters without college degrees.  The diploma gap is largely not a gap of comprehension as is suggested and celebrated by mocking, generally youthful, Youtubers who record  hapless Maga’s caught out by simple questions of  general knowledge. Instead the education gap is one of economic consequences. Not having a college degree is a huge economic disadvantage framed by a sneering discourse of personal failure, ignorance and stupidly. As college degrees have become less exclusive they have become more essential as the rite of passage to many creative, well paid and secure jobs. 52% of Americans do not possess a college degree and since all education systems depend on there being winners and losers in order to establish the value of academic success, after all there’s no value in a golden ticket if everyone has one, those who fail know, consciously or otherwise, that the system is rigged against them. It wasn’t so obvious in the past as well paid alternatives to  a college based career path were once plentiful. While economists points out that the American economy continues to be one of strongest in the world ordinary workers feel like they’re falling behind and that their children may fall even further behind.[28]

In 2000, Robert Putnam forecast that United States  democracy was at risk from the twin challenges of declining civic engagement and rising interpersonal inequality[29]. Others have pointed to a hollowing out of once stable communities in middle America  as the result of long-term economic and population decline.  ‘Declining communities in parts of the American Rustbelt, the Great Plains, and elsewhere, reacted at the ballot box to being ignored, neglected and being left-behind’. The turn to Trumpism  has been mapped on to these area as a ‘rising geography of discontent.’[30] or the ‘politics of resentment.’[31] These heartlands of Trumpism have been are ‘places that don’t matter’  and they have had enough of seeing their people leave and their jobs go and have used Trumps as a means to exact revenge on a system  that has forgotten them. By contrast, the more dynamic, mainly urban, areas of the US, where society was always more unstable and where a culture of transience is more accepting of inequalities have, so far, shunned  populism[32].

Social mobility and faith in the America dream has been undermined by one of the most significant changes in US society the mid twentieth century, which is in property ownership. Property owning or at least secure renting was the cornerstone of the post war liberal capitalist contract. The GI bill made its easier for (white) GIs to own a home and contributed to the post war economic boom. By 1955, 4.3 million home loans worth $33 billion had been granted to veterans, who were responsible for buying 20 percent of all new homes built after the war. Although the GI bill continues to assist veterans, for millions of Americans the prospect of owning a home has receded [33] and millions feel insecure in the home they live in. 13% of people in the US think it is likely they will lose their homes. Numbers are higher among renters 18% and young people 22%.[34]

 “ Just 8 percent of people in Rwanda, a country with GDP per capita 100th the size of the US, feel insecure. The question we should be asking ourselves is why so many people living in advanced economies – including the US – fully expect to lose their home or land in the coming years.”

Security in one’s home is fundamental to the feeling of having stake in society. [35]That millions of American feel betrayed in this most visceral of expectations is another factor in the appeal of Trump.

However it is in the stagnation of  US household incomes in this century which has most keenly undermined the American dream. This stagnation can  be attributed in part to two recessions since 2000. After the first recession, which lasted from March 2001 to November 2001,  it was not until 2007 that the median income was restored to about its level in 2000. But 2007  the onset of the Banking Crisis  and the following recession meant that it took until 2015 for incomes to approach their pre-recession level. Indeed, the median household income in 2015 – $70,200 – was no higher than its level in 2000, marking a 15-year period of stagnation, an episode of unprecedented duration in the past five decades.[36]

The second stand of inequality is what happened to the rich. They got a lot richer. While the majority of Americans tend to believe that being rich is deserved and or natural in a market economy. Income and wealth inequality is higher in the United States than in almost any other developed country According to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office,[37] income inequality in the United States has been rising for decades, with the incomes of the highest echelon of earners rapidly outpacing the rest of the population. The growth of CEO pay is illustrative of this trend. In 1965, a typical corporate CEO earned about twenty times that earned by a typical worker; by 2018, the ratio was 278:1, according to the Economic Policy Institute, a progressive think tank. Between 1978 and 2018, CEO compensation increased by more than 900 percent while worker compensation increased by just 11.9 percent.[38]

How does wealth inequality, particularly the exponential increase in the wealth of the top 1% explain Trump? Afterall Trump is rich and many of his policies fuelled inequality by benefitting the rich and  in a survey Americans under the age of 30 expressed contempt and resentment by mostly agreeing with the statement, “Most rich people in the United States got rich by taking advantage of other people” [39] and resentment of the rich has grown in the US     roughly three-in-ten Americans (29%) adults say it’s a bad thing for the country that some people have personal fortunes of a billion dollars or more, the majority continue to say it is neither good nor bad[40]

 Why are ordinary Americans who struggle to pay their bills not repelled by  Trump, who flaunts and exaggerates his wealth, who brags about avoiding taxes? The answer might be that Trump is able to distance himself not from being rich but from  not being the kind of rich which millions of Americans have come to view as the ‘elites’. The right wing Heritage Foundation declared ‘With Trump’s Win, “Ordinary” Americans Declared Independence from the Elites’[41]In this assertion  there is an expression of the symbolic separation which Trump represents between his own wealth and privilege and wealth and privilege as it manifests itself in the minds of millions of Americans. Trump is vulgar rich, he is crass and unashamed rich and  he is the kind of rich millions of Americans can identify with. Bernard Shaw observed that vulgarity in the rich flatter the masses[42] since it either reinforces their bourgeois pretentions or it legitimises their own level of consumption. The vastly rich Roman patrician, Cicero wrote that slaves don’t dream of freedom they dream of owning a slave[43] and so those who work and scrimp and save can believe that Trump is how they would behave if they were rich. When Trump states that only stupid people pay taxes many hear this as refreshing honesty, free of virtue signalling and moralising. In this sense Trump becomes an authentic expression of  aspiration bound up with resentment. Bruce Springsteen’s songs may evoke images of rustbelt decline and abandoned communities, but he’s a rich entertainer who never worked a day in steel mill or auto shop. The denim and dirty fingernails are stage makeup and costumes.  The paradoxical sense in which one of the most inauthentic individuals ever to grace the American political landscape, could establish himself with such technicolour veracity in the minds of millions as ‘the real deal,’ can partly be explained as a visceral reaction to the glittering know all’s and celebrity liberals. In hindsight Kamala’s glitzy celebrity drenched rallies only reinforced the  reek of entitlement which surrounded the Democrats. If you are horrified that people might not want to pay their taxes, you don’t understand the realities of most people’s lives.

After the election Bernie Sanders blamed Trump’s success on the failure to convince millions of ordinary American that the Democrats spoke for them "It should come as no great surprise that a Democratic Party which has abandoned working class people would find that the working class has abandoned them, First, it was the white working class, and now it is Latino and Black workers as well. While the Democratic leadership defends the status quo, the American people are angry and want change. And they’re right."[44] Trump’s campaign understood this better than Kamala’s when they ran ads which said "Kamala is for they/them, President Trump is for you"[45]

Did Trump’s campaign benefit from the Culture Wars? The  term culture wars can be traced back to Nixon’s appeal to the silent majority or Pat Buchanan’s call to arms in the 1992 Republican Convention[46]. While the Republican party’s journey towards conservatism became more apparent with Barry Goldwater’s presidential bid  and Ronald Reagan’s election many scholars point to the impact of Roe v Wade 1974 which made abortion a political totem for social conservatism and the Christian right in a way it hadn’t been before.[47] The reaction to Roe began the politicisation of the evangelical Christian right and the transformation of the  Republican party from its historically libertarian outlook to social conservatism.

For the origins of the Culture Wars others looked to demographics which was labelled the big sort.[48] Increasingly Americans were divided by  zip code as people chose to live in neighbourhoods populated with people just like themselves which produced geographic political polarization. Although some commentators have noted that  rural and urban setting have always been aligned with different attitudes to politics A study by Ron Johnston, David Manley, and Kelvyn Jones in Annals of American Association of Geographers concluded that not only do like-minded people cluster together with other like-minded people, such clustering together makes people more like-minded. Their analysis suggests ‘Polarization has increased in most U.S. states.  Just three had less political polarization in 2012 than in 1992. And polarization is increasing within states as well’[49].

  Whether the origins of culture wars are found in spatial polarisation or the politicisation of religion the conflict has intensified. The initial hot button issues of abortion, feminism,   and privacy, described by  James Davison Hunter, a sociologist at the University of Virginia in his 1991 book, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America has  broadened  in this century to include education and gender, and reached a polarising intensity during the debate over Obamacare which gave rise to the Tea Party and during the pandemic, where mask wearing and vaccines stoked a toxic crescendo of fear, threats and paranoia. The enemy was at the gates in the guise of antifa, immigrants and the radical left or the World Bank whose plots were as subtle as they were ambitious in the form of the great reset or the great replacement. Millions of Americans who did not subscribe to the most florid of these fears still perceived a way of life and its values under siege. It is in this febrile atmosphere that Trump has prospered.

 During the re-election campaign, the themes of the culture war were  presented by Trump in the form of simple graphic images ‘ immigrants eating dogs and cats’ symbolised a decent into barbarity. ‘Children  having gender reassignment surgery while at school without their parents’ consent’ played on a theme of defending the young from the malign influence of woke teachers who were also teaching children to be ashamed. Schools were  seen as great betrayers since they were “the institution most counted on to ensure the reproduction of American norms”.[50] Forcing children to wear masks was a synonym for wokeism, secularism and crucial race theory. Trump responded by promising to abolish the Department of Education and end“ wokeness ” and “left-wing indoctrination.” Trump  repeatedly said he will cut money to “any school pushing critical race theory, transgender insanity, and other inappropriate racial, sexual or political content on our children.” On the campaign trail, Trump said he would “not give one penny” to schools with vaccine or mask requirements. It wasn’t that the culture wars agenda appealed widely to Americans, fewer than 42% said they generally agreed with Trump’s views, instead it was the impact it had on Republicans. 80% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents said they agreed with Trump on many or nearly all important issues facing the country.[51] Trump was articulating their concerns, the imagery may have been hyperbolic but nonetheless the sentiment struck a chord.

However there remains a baffling question.  How did Trump win the presidential election with overwhelming Christian evangelical support when he scorns traditional Christian values has affairs, divorces, and alleged sexual assaults and harassment? In 2016 there was deep antipathy to Hilary Clinton which went back to 1992 and her perceived insult to traditional stay-at-home women (“Well, I guess I could have stayed home and baked cookies …”) The social scientist  Maries Griffith wrote  for many evangelical Christians, ‘Women coming to power upend the way the world is supposed to work, at least in the conservative churches where they are not allowed to occupy positions of highest leadership[52].’ White working-class men in many communities have also adopted a narrative of victimization[53]. This augment proposes that resentment of liberals was simply greater than dislike of Trump’s persona. ‘He may be an ally cat, but he’s our ally cat’ In this sense Trump’s behaviour could be distanced form his rhetoric. He may not live their values but he said the right things and made the right promises. Historian Laura Gifford author of The centre Cannot Hold wrote  ‘Pro-Trump evangelicals are willing to forgive behaviour that would get one kicked out of Sunday School if the leader of their party will articulate their policy priorities—and nominate conservative candidates to the Supreme Court’. This was not without some difficulty Following Jerry Falwell Jr.’s support of Trump and suggestion that white evangelicals to do the same, Mark DeMoss, a former aide to  Falwell and the chairman the Board of Trustees at the evangelical institution, Liberty University, resigned stating that the Trump campaign and Falwell Jr.’s support of the same were antithetical to the values for which Falwell Sr. and Liberty stood.[54] While many Christians saw in Trump a way back to a lost, white Christian past and others admired his entrepreneurial skill and low tax pro-business agenda, there was however one Trumpian value evangelicals were united on and that was his claim to have been responsible for overturning Roe v Wade. Democrats hoped that abortion rights might mobilise women against Trump and the more they pinned their hopes on the prochoice vote, the more those who were anti-abortion saw in Trump a bulwark against backsliding on the gains they had made. Trump positioned himself, as much as possible as moderate on abortion, arguing the issue should be left to states, pledged to veto a national abortion ban should it reach his desk and stated his support for in-vitro fertilization and other reproductive health services, and promised to be a champion for women. This aimed to neutralise the abortion issue but Kamala needed to bring it front and centre which position Trump as the pro-life candidate. In the end the Dobbs[55] backlash did not happen and evangelical Christians turned out for Trump[56].

Is the internet and social media responsible for Trump? This hypotheses builds on the more general concern that internet media fuels extremism, polarisation and paranoia by suggesting this is an atmosphere in which Trumpism thrives.  The most commonly identified feature of social media which may explain Trump is  the creation of ‘echo chambers’. The term suggests that the new media reflects back to its various audiences the messages they wish to hear. They rely on confirmation bias, which the tendency to favour information that reinforces our existing beliefs. It also proposes that this is different from the print media which similarly appealed to its readers, because this new media was exclusive. It wasn’t just that social media algorithms create ‘filter bubbles’ which give the consumers what they like, it was that this occurred in the context of a loss of faith in, and a withdrawal from the mainstream media. Most commentators typically worry about echo chambers[57] and filter bubbles because they fear they will fuel polarisation, diminish mutual understanding, and ultimately lead to a situation where people are so far apart that they have no common ground – effectively inhabiting different realities[58]. The virality of content on social media through “friend” networks means that this content, whether fake or real, tends to travel quickly and “echo” among like-minded people. Is it this that insulates Trump from the kind of critical analysis which untethered the campaigns of so many politicians in the age of mainstream media? Gary Hart’s bright start to the primaries of 1988 fell apart with one story of marital infidelity.[59] In 2004 Howard Dean’s campaign collapsed after he yelled too enthusiastically[60] and in 2011 Texas governor Rick Pery exited the presidential race after forgetting his lines in a debate.[61]

While it’s true Ronald Reagan was describe as the Teflon president since he seemed untouched by the consequences of personal gaffs or scandals in his administration and Clinton weather credible revelations on having had an affair with Jennifer Flowers to earn the title ‘the comeback kid’,but neither bumbling charm nor changing social attitudes explain Trump’s stratospheric ability to sale above scandal and outrage. Trump it seems is uniquely invulnerable to a bad press. He famously said that he could shoot someone in Times Square and remain popular[62]. Trump attributed this to a simple matter of loyalty on the part of his supporters and indeed his core supporters are remarkably unmoved by his bad press.

 The question remains why? If the answer is the influence of social media echo chambers there is some reason to doubt this as much more than a narrow effect. A  literature review by the Royal Society in 2022 concluded that  echo chambers are much less widespread than is commonly assumed, and found no support for the filter bubble hypothesis and found a very mixed picture on polarisation and the role of news and media use in contributing to polarisation[63] instead they suggest that  studies both in the UK and several other countries, including the highly polarised US,  found that most people have relatively diverse media diets. However these studies point to polarising effects for example Professor Andrew  Guess

suggested “even if most Americans do not exist in online echo chambers, they are subject to the political influence of those who do.”[64] This is a variation on the elite values model of media influence but instead of liberal elites it points to the disproportionate influence of the cadre of cultural and political influencers  whose reach can be huge such as Joe Rogan or extreme such as Alex Jones. They can reach people as they sit in their cars, wait for trains or walk in the street. This is ubiquitous media, unlimited by schedules with no obligation to balance, verify or explain. Author Chis Bail  argues that user behaviour on line is powering deep social divisions, but  his concern  is that rather than locking people into comfortable hobbit holes of their own kind, it draws them in to new landscapes of extremism and conspiracy. ‘It functions more like a prism that distorts our identities, empowers status-seeking extremists, and renders moderates all but invisible’[65].

In Echo Chambers, Fake News, and Social Epistemology Jennifer Lackey argues that the echo chamber effect is not based on the exclusivity of the message but its unreliability. In other words it’s the introduction of specious information into the public discourse which while it validates some misinformation it also undermines trust in all media[66]. The most outlandish ‘fake news’ stories made little impact beyond the die hard Trump believers[67] but  contributed to the atmosphere of distrust and the prevailing belief that we are in a post truth age where ‘no one really knows’ and ‘they all lie’. This may help to answer a question that perplexes the traditional news commentators, why aren’t people repelled by Trump’s lies?

Trump routinely asserts easily debunked lies, but being found out in a lie does not hurt Trump. While this is new, lying politicians is not. The expectation that a politician might not tell the truth is as old as politics, what is new is the level of desensitisation[68] Being caught in a lie might be expected to be at least embarrassing and possibly damaging, but Trump has pushed through the sound barrier of lies and each outraged reaction or fact checking is quickly forgotten pushed aside  by the  next lie. Trump knows the press  are compelled  to repeat his most outrageous claims so his lies reach millions of people through constant repetition in the press and social media. They appal, they repel and some lies are believed but overall they receive a resounding shrug and create few if any harmful effects for Trump.

A CNN fact check identified 12 completely fictional stories Trump told in the month preceding the election. These included that Kamala Harris planned to bring back the draft, he said “She’s already talking about bringing back the draft. She wants to bring back the draft, and draft your child, and put them in a war that should never have happened.” Trump claimed that schools are sending children for gender-reassigning surgeries without their parents’ knowledge. He said, “The transgender thing is incredible. Think of it. Your kid goes to school and comes home a few days later with an operation. The school decides what’s going to happen with your child.” At a September press conference in California, Trump claimed that “if I ran with an honest vote counter in California I would win California, but the votes are not counted honestly.” He had delivered an even more colourful version of the claim in an interview in late August, saying, “If Jesus came down and was the vote counter, I would win California, okay?” Trump’s running mate JD Vance and Elon Musk suggested the Democrats were behind the assassination attempts on Trump.  "I want to just address the elephant in the room here, which is of course just a couple of days ago my running mate, my dear friend and our next president was nearly assassinated, again," Vance said. "Two assassination attempts in as many months." Elon Musk, who has nearly 200 million followers on X,  suggested in a quickly deleted post  that it was odd that "no one is even trying to assassinate" Vice President Harris or President Biden.

Some Trump supporters know these are lies but don’t mind,  like Trump supporter  James Cassidy  who was interviewed by Daniel Dale for the University of Notre dame blog, Truth in Politics. He said he didn’t need the director of the FBI to tell him Barack Obama never wiretapped Donald Trump at Trump Tower. Cassidy knew from the start that Trump made the whole thing up. He was happy the president lied. “He’s ruffling every feather in Washington that he can ruffle. These guys are scrambling. So: yeah! I like it. I think it’s a good thing. I want to see them jump around a little bit,”[69]. Among the many reasons that Trump’s supporters excuse his lying is that they, like Trump himself, do not really hold him to the standards that other humans are held to. And that is because many of his supporters, like Trump himself, do not consider him to be a person ‘he is more like a primal force or superhero, more than a person, but less than a person, too.’[70]

Rather than Trump’s unique almost etra teristrial qualityies others have argued that Trump benefits form existing in the post truth world.

‘In our new normal, experts are dismissed, alternative facts are (sometimes flagrantly) offered, and public figures can offer opinions on pretty much anything. And thanks to social media, pretty much anyone can be a public figure. In much public discourse, identity outranks arguments’ [71]

For this line of reasoning  the most compelling reason for Trump’s invulnerability is a general loss of faith in the mainstream media and the validity of knowledge itself. The Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition asked us to ‘ Imagine a world that considers knowledge to be “elitist.’’[72]  and a  post I came across from brendanschaub on X  voiced the feelings of resentment at  being threatened, being condescended to, being vilified by the media, liberal elites for believing what people used to take for granted.

Main stream media is officially dead.

I don't know anyone under 50 that takes CNN or Fox

serious. The celebrity endorsements didn't work.

Anyone with a few brain cells knows those people

are completely full of sh*t. It’s not the flex you think

it is. The left ran on hate and thought Americans

were dumb enough to vote for someone they never

asked for in the first place. You were told this was a

close race and it wasn’t even remotely close in any

facet. They tried to separate us, they told you

America was racist, they told you if you vote for

Trump you're a N*zi. None of it worked. The gig is

up. The woke crap, the DEI non sense, it's over. Keep

our kids safe, protect the border, and keep us out of war. That's it.

Thank God.

Not only does Brendan resent being misled he sees himself as being in possession of a more comprehensible truth which rests on a simple heartfelt desire to stay safe. So rather than a post truth world it’s a clash of truths. The truth which seems right, which I can see with my own eyes and which the people I know believe, as against the truth  of those who do not know us or care about us.

The widespread belief that traditional media have not been telling the truth and have been peddling an agenda of the left, which has  undermined traditional values and placed America in harms way, underpins the mission of the conservative media,  to push aside the stodgy mainstream media of print journalism and television and unseat the left elites and their woke agenda.

This was first promoted by Fox News, who presented themselves as champions who sought to balance a media dominated by liberals and establish themselves  as the television manifestation of the shock jocks like  Rush Limbaugh and Howard Stern. Michael Tomasky writing in the |New Rpublic sees a right-wing media coup where   ‘the right-wing media—Fox News (and the entire News Corp.), Newsmax, One America News Network, the Sinclair network of radio and TV stations and newspapers, iHeart Media (formerly Clear Channel), the Bott Radio Network (Christian radio), Elon Musk’s X, the huge podcasts like Joe Rogan’s, and much more—sets the news agenda in this country’. He concludes that ‘This is why Donald Trump won. Indeed, the right-wing media is why he exists in our political lives in the first place. Don’t believe me? Try this thought experiment. Imagine Trump coming down that escalator in 2015 with no right-wing media; no Fox News; an agenda still set, and mores still established, by staid old CBS News, the House of Murrow, and The New York Times. That atmosphere would have denied an outrageous figure like Trump the oxygen he needed to survive and flourish. He just would not have been taken seriously at all. In that world, ruled by a traditional mainstream media, Trump would have been seen by Republicans as a liability, and they would have done what they failed to do in real life—banded together to marginalize him’.[73] . Michael Tomasky like much of the left see a concerted right-wing media take over as a kind of reverse ‘elites theory’ which is indeed how Fox see themselves. In his book Evil Geniuses: The Unmaking of America: A Recent History Kurt Andersen describes the conquest of American political discourse by the radical right in politics and the law, and  the neo-liberals in economics. He blames the  complacent and complicit establishment, and liberal “useful idiots’’ for letting it happen. This is a top down explanation whereas the rise of Joe Rogan, Lex Fridman  and Theo Von whose medium is the podcast,  represent a  great change in the media landscape, but in one which grew organically from below. While the media has always been a transmitter of establishment ideology whose central concern is to run  profit-oriented businesses dependent on advertisers for their revenues. The media has always chased the down veins of discontent and flattered its consumers by the belief that they, the reader or listener, had selected a voice which articulated their own ability to see the truth. The trick of all media businesses is to sell the myth of intellectual agency. In this, Rogan is supreme. He has made himself the  avatar of the common man who sees in Rogan personal validation and an authority  burnished by  Rogan’s huge wealth, which can be both envied and admired and read as a signifier of value and authenticity. Rogan like Trump exist in a media landscape where a anything might be true so nothing also might be true. Trump trades in lies and Rogan in passivity. You just never know there may be  aliens visiting our planet, maybe vaccines do cause autism- who knows?

After Trump’s victory many of those who wished it had not been so asked ‘why in the name of all that’s holy did Kamal not do the Rogan podcast?’If the name of the game in politics is ‘persuasion’ did Kamala and the Democrats fail to understand the realities of the new media landscape?

Rogan’s podcast is a media phenomenon. His audience dwarves the mainstream media with regular viewing/listening numbers of 15 million plus.  He is a Walter Cronkite for the internet age, trusted by millions as a guy who seeks the truth with an open mind and the sensibilities of middle America. His podcast format is the long form interview, a simulated chat between friends. Rogan is gently sceptical and at times innocently amazed or appalled by the revelations or assertions of his ‘expert’ guests. Interviews range from comics and musicians to politicians to authors and scientists. The mix of guests blurs the distinction between journalism and entertainment in the manner of many news and magazine programmes on mainstream media, but his language of moderation and moral equivalence reassures with familiarity  and masks his profoundly libertarian agenda. Rogan also projects optimism and an endearingly  naïve quest to know the truth as well as a drive to succeed. He’s ‘Joe’ the big guy who’s fun to banter with, who can shed a tear, someone guys can admire and above all he’ll never talk down to you even if you think microwaves are turning people gay or Trump won the in 2020 or vaccines are part of a liberal conspiracy.

The Joe Rogan  message, heard by millions loud and clear, is simple, those we once trusted, the media, the politicians the academics are now not to be trusted. This is the politics of anti-establishment, it ranges from a healthy desire to ‘know for myself’ to the upside-down world of paranoia and conspiracy theories, it travels there by way  resentment of those elites and intellectuals who talk down to the common man. In the final weeks of the campaign Kamala’s nonappearance on Rogan’s podcast contrasted with Trump’s lengthy interview. It wasn’t so much that the gentle chat Trump had with Rogan showcased anything admirable in Trump or exposed anything new and troubling,  it was its reassuring effect which seemed to neutralise the ‘threat to democracy’ rhetoric coming from Kamala. When Trump chuckled at Rogan’s suggestion that  he benefited from so much publicity because. ‘You’ve said a lot of wild shit,’ they both seemed to acknowledge and celebrate the game he was playing. Although Kamala did interviews  on Alex Cooper’s Call Her Daddy podcast and   Howard Stern’s radio show as well as  sharing a beer with Stephen Colbert on his late-night show, and  on Whoopi Goldberg’s The View  where she announced that, if she won, Medicare would pay for home care, she could not escape that even without saying a word, she articulated  an accusation that if you did not support her you were racist or sexist and when she spoke, her appeals to our better instincts, sounded like moralising. Trump’s and Rogan’s shared joke seemed so much more appealing, so much more honest.

The richest man in the world endorsed Trump but the most famous woman in the world endorsed Kamala. Elon Musk whose credentials for being a commentator on our times is entirely based on his monumental wealth, was interviewed by Joe Rogan, endorsed Trump, appeared at Trump rallies and gave away millions in a doubtfully legal lottery scheme which bordered on campaign bribery. Musk donated an estimated $132m to Trump and other Republicans in the run-up to the election, according to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) Two of the biggest donations – $43.6m and $75m – went directly into the Trump campaign machine, notably the America PAC (political action committee) established by Musk himself. However,  since Kamala’s campaign outspent Trump’s it doubtful the money was decisive. If Musk has a significant impact it was what Musk represented. Like Trumpism, Musk presents the same image of the limitless possibility of the unfettered individual, free of wokery. In an age of extended childhood Musk is a kind of superannuated adolescent, a child-man, unashamed to play with mega toys, rockets and superfast tunnel trains. While like Trump the reality of Musk’s business acumen is doubtful and largely a fabrication,[74] he is as the owner of X formally Twitter,  a self-appointed media mogul of the internet age and a champion of free speech who will restrict access to X at the behest of the Indian or Chinese governments in the interests of profit. Musk appeals to white men and promotes fear of immigrants and election conspiracy. In this way Musk reinforced and burnished  the Trumpian message. Taylor Swift was prompted to support Kamala by J D Vance’s crass ‘cat lady’ comments and her Instagram post was followed by a spike in voter registrations. However a poll from YouGov found just eight percent of voters said Swift’s endorsement would see them “somewhat” or “much more likely” to vote for Harris, while 20 percent said they would be less likely to vote for her.[75]  Professor of Media Robert Thompson made the point that celebrity endorsements are most likely overvalued. “I think it’s a lot harder to have a celebrity, even one that you admire, completely overturn all of that complex identity-building that has taken place over time.”[76] Celebrity endorsements make for easy journalism and are clickbait but their impact is probably unmeasurable and while Taylor Swift is a cultural phenomenon  her  endorsement  may have only added to the perception that Kamala  was the candidate of glitter and celebrity which was a narrative she was struggling to escape.

 In 2016 Trump’s call to Make America Great Again sounded like Reagans ‘Morning Again in America’ or Obama’s ‘Change the World’ full of optimism with  added nostalgia and an implied accusation against those who had allowed America to lose its greatness.  In 2024 how could the Maga slogan still resonate with no obvious evidence of any progress to restored greatness in Trump’s first term? An explanation might be that MAGA is not meant to be a pragmatic programme of recovery, its appeal lies firmly in the realm of symbol and imagination. Sociologist Max Weber identified the one of the features of a  charismatic leader as the ability to align oneself with the sacred and to capture the imagination of ones followers  so completely that they see the leader as the embodiment of their most cherished desires. In this sense we’re asking another question. Is Trump’s appeal more than political and more than ideological? Is Maga in fact a cult ?

Much has been written an said about the Maga cult. The strength of its adherent’s conviction certainty explains why for these supporters at least  nothing could detach them from their love of Trump. Is the Maga cult any different from the core supporters or the base which all politicians and parties rely on? While many politicians have generated an enthusiastic and devoted following few can have had so many who see themselves as devoted to a man  "chosen by God"[77] to lead them. Trump reinforces the Maga sense that they are a people apart, on a mission, surrounded by enemies and in procession or a rare and precious truth. A poll conducted from Aug. 16 to 18 by CBS News/YouGov[78] demonstrates just how firm Trump's power over his followers continues to be. A large majority of Republican voters view Trump as "honest and trustworthy," Furthermore, "Trump's voters hold him as a source of true information, even more so than other sources, including conservative media figures, religious leaders, and even their own friends and family." When asked who they believe tells them the truth, 71% of Trump voters picked him, more than picked friends and family members (63%), right-wing media commentators (56%) and religious leaders (only 42%). Trump’s symbolic power is demonstrated in his attacks which no matter how cruel are viewed by his most loyal followers as as righteous vengeance for  perceived wrongs they have suffered and the threats they face.  In  2016 at the  Republican convention,  Trump said “I am your voice," and “I alone can fix it. I will restore law and order.” Or in 2023, he told a crowd in Maryland that in addition to being their voice, “Today, I add: I am your warrior. I am your justice. And for those who have been wronged and betrayed, I am your retribution.” Trump’s appeal   surpasses what a leader in a democratic system typically asks from their supporters. Which past president could direct a mob to storm Congress and see it happen? The Maga cult begins  and ends with trust in  Trump. He attacks not only ideological and electoral opponents- but also those who might  share power with him from within the Republican party, Little Marco, Lyin’ Ted, Ron de-sanctimonious. For the Maga core this demonstrates how loyalty is the supreme principle of Trumpism.

The attempted assassination created an image of iconic status as a bloodied Trump punched the air and exclaimed ‘fight, fight’. For the Maga core this was confirmation of Trump’s providential mission, just as his angry, vengeful mugshot showed him defiantly alone and surrounded by enemies as they, his loyal Maga’s see themselves, their communities and their values.

However, no matter how dedicated and loyal the MAGA core they are not a large proportion of the electorate and certainly not the majority of Trump voters. The adherence of MAGA shows it political power inside the Republican party of Congressional primaries and caucuses where turnouts are low. In this sense the MAGA cult is a force which has reshaped the Republican Party but has not determined the result of presidential elections. Although in campaigning the enthusiasm and willingness on Trump supporters to sit through long delayed rallies and rambling Trumpian monologues had a genuine theatrical impact. Trump’s rallies make headlines and push aside his rivals in the media. When Kmamal clearly stuck a nerve in the presidential debate by suggesting his crowds were bored and leaving his rallies early, she upset Trump, but seemed to sneer at people who had travelled far, waited long and had jobs and families to get back to. Trump’s supporters attend rallies as pilgrims attend shrines, it’s enough to go and to have been there. Did Kamala see rallies as valued by their entertainment value alone?

Many Americans saw the 2024 election as an existential moment for democracy. If the future of democracy was on the line and the fate of the republic was in the balance, why didn’t this argument work? Biden and Kamala both asserted that democracy itself was on the ballot and Trump represented a unique threat. Whatever the merits of this argument it did not carry the day since one of the more peculiar aspects of Donald J. Trump’s political appeal is this: A lot of people are happy to vote for him because they simply do not believe he will do many of the things he says he will. As many journalists and Trump’s opponents have noted, you should take Trump seriously but not literally. This view seems  justified by experience in that Trump was president for four years. He’s a known quantity and the cataclysmic predictions which preceded his first term did not come to pass. Many critics of Trump might object by pointing to the transformed Supreme Court and judiciary in general and the resulting overturning of Roe v Wade or a fairly obvious attempt to overturn democracy,  but still, by luck or otherwise, it was not the end of the world. True there was a Muslim ban but this was limited by the Supreme Court. Mexico was not forced to pay for the wall, Trump did not leave NATO,  he didn’t lock up Hilary, he didn’t repeal Obamacare and he didn’t radically cut the Education Department and many Americans look back at the Trump years as prosperous and peaceful. “It’s the salience of issues today that colour the memories that people have of Trump,”[79] said John Sides, a professor of political science at Vanderbilt. The salient issues in 2024 were inflation and immigration. ‘A week is a long time in politics’ observed British PM Harold Wilson and four years put Trump in a distant and more prosperous and more peaceful past. In 2024 Pew Research found that positive or ‘warm’ feelings towards Trump had improved steadily among Republican since 2016. ‘Republicans and Republican leaners feel very warm toward Trump. About eight-in-ten (78%) rate him very warmly (60%) or warmly (18%), while relatively small shares say they have a neutral (8%) or cold (14%) view of him’.[80]

Another explanation is that Trump’s violent rhetoric sounds like he’s not being serious. It’s just too crazy. For example Trump’s assertion that t “one really violent day”  would end property crime “One rough hour — and I mean real rough,” Trump said. “The word will get out and it will end immediately.” This is the rhetoric of  your mad uncle who’s had a glass too many- is it meant to be a joke? Also what does it mean and how could it be done? The impracticality and ambiguity of Trump’s musings tend towards the conclusion that he won’t actually do any of this. The established fact of Trump’s cascade of lies and falsehoods also tends to the conclusion amongst the non-Maga Trump voters that Trump communicates in crowd pleasing hyperbole not reality. So when he says he’ll weaponize the Justice Department and jail political opponents or purge the government of non-loyalists it’s easy to think it won’t happen. In a  New York Times/Siena College poll, 41 percent of likely voters agreed with the assessment that “people who are offended by Donald Trump take his words too seriously.”[81] When in his book Bob Woodward, sites General Mark A. Milley  as saying the former president is “fascist to the core.” It doesn’t fit what actually happened and appears to be scare mongering.

Another reason those who may not be devoted supporters voted Trump is that  resentment and a sense that many millions of Americans see themselves as having been left behind and belittled goes far beyond the Maga core. This is a resentment  fuelled by a perceived attack on the values and certainties of middle America which according to this narrative are the common sense values which prevailed in the era when America was great, a mythical yesteryear of big cars, lifelong blue collar jobs and apple pie. This mythic America was also white. The worm which infected this halcyon age is the ‘woke agenda’ of critical race theory and  gender fluidity and of course immigrants who are not white. These new Americans are from places described by Trump as the ‘shit hole’ countries[82]. For some Americans this adds to the ‘great replacement’ conspiracy but for far more it’s simply a feeling of being ‘as mad as hell and not going to take this anymore’.

If Trump’s supporter were to varying extents persuaded by the narrative of the Republican right that Trump’s victory is a revolt against the insidious encroachment of forces antithetical to the liberties and sensibilities of the common sense folk of middle America. There  was another narrative one which  Kamala and the Democrats could not overcome, ‘it’s the economy stupid’. In the end are all elections about the economy and Reagan’s question ‘Are you better off than you were four years ago’ hung around Kamala neck and meant she was sunk form the start? This was the argument which reached across party loyalties and persuaded those who might otherwise be repelled by Trump. During Biden’s presidency the long term trends of globalisation, industrial decline, export  of jobs and the faltering progress of generational living standard were joined by something much more immediate and recognisable, inflation. Inflation in the United States reached 9% in 2022, which was the highest rate of inflation that the US had experienced in over 40 years. A survey by The Associated Press found high prices were the number one concern for about half of all Trump voters. A study by Maziar Minovi, who heads the Eurasia Group, of elections over several decades found that whenever there's a sustained period of high inflation, voters are twice as likely to lose faith in the people running the government. This applies in most democracies,  when there is an inflationary shock across the world, the risk of the incumbents getting kicked out increases.[83] According to exit polls from CBS News, 75% of voters reported that inflation had caused moderate or severe hardship for them over the past year, with 45% saying they were worse off now than they were four years ago. During his campaign,  Trump vowed again and again to end inflation and strengthen the economy.[84]

For many Americans the simple  observation that inflation was lower during the Trump years meant  that “His track record proved to be, on balance, positive, and people look back now and think: ‘Oh, OK. Let’s try that again,’ said Douglas Holtz-Eakin, a former White House economic adviser, director of the Congressional Budget Office and now president of the conservative American Action Forum think tank.[85] This simple observation was a truth Kamala could not escape no matter how many economists pointed out that by almost every macroeconomic measure the economy had fared better under Biden than Trump. Research by Harvard University economist Stefanie Stantcheva shows that people blame inflation for making things more expensive, but they think that they personally deserve all the credit when they get new jobs or pay increases.[86] In other word inflation is seen as a unique kind of betrayal by the government and one that is prodded back into the forefront of people’s minds every time they visit an supermarket. This visceral reality also obscured regular analysis by economists who pointed out that many of Trump’s plans would likely add to inflation An immigration ban would push up labour costs, tariffs on imports would act as an additional tax on products on the stores and tax cuts would put more money in the economy the result would be higher inflation and higher interest rates. But that’s all in the future, here and now are the price of groceries.

The other burden which Kamala carried was Biden’s record on immigration. Although Kamala was unfairly labelled the ‘border tzar’ a title she never had, nonetheless she was strongly associated in the minds of millions of people with immigration failure and Donald Trump,  largely succeeded in setting the terms of the debate by attacking his Democratic rival, with hyperbolic claims that she supported “open borders” and false accusations that the US is experiencing a wave of violent crimes committed by migrants. The number of migrants crossing the US border with Mexico has grown significantly over the past 15 years. And the presence of tens of thousands of migrants in cities across the US – some 120,000 of them having been bussed to northern US cities by Texas Governor Abbott since the summer of 2022 – ‘lends plausibility to the dominant framing that immigration is a problem to be solved, rather than a complex phenomenon to be managed, let alone an opportunity for maintaining economic growth and national vitality’.[87]

The saliency of immigration in the minds of millions of Americans as well as the fact that there was a surge in immigration on America’s southern boarder in the first years of the Biden Presidency  were inescapable for the Harris campaign. In Biden’s defence this was unfair.  The jump in immigration the under Biden had much to do with the ending of covid restrictions on travel.  Trump had rallied Republicans early in 2024  to block a $118 billion bipartisan Senate bill that tied border reforms to Ukraine aid. From May 2023, Biden officials deported or returned roughly 740,000 people to Mexico and other countries, more than any year since 2010, according to the Department of Homeland Security.[88] The increases in migrant figures seen at the US-Mexico border  since 2020 came at a time when, globally, migration to rich countries is at an all-time high. Finally immigrants crossing the border was falling in the Summer of 2024.

But Biden had ended many of Trump’s restrictions which even though these were widely condemned as cruel, particularly the separation of parents and children his administration still enforced a strict boarder policy , it  led to the unshakable perception of failure. By 2024 polls consistently showed that  more than two-thirds of Americans disapproved of Biden's handling of the issue. This disapproval also included those who felt Biden had failed to find a humane and comprehensive alternative to  Trump’s policies. Biden had managed to generate the disapproval of opponents and supporters of immigration.

By any objective measure Trump has said things which are racist, selective bans on Muslims entering America, ‘shit hole countries,’ immigrants eating cats and dogs as well as being rapists and murderers, so surly in an America more diverse than at any point in its history, the minority vote should have gone overwhelmingly to Harris, but it really didn’t or at least not overwhelmingly.

Over the years the Democrat party and its candidate for the presidency could rely on being the party of minorities and immigrants. For much of the 20th Century the Democrats were the dominant party based on their mobilisation of a coalition established by Frankin Roosevelt’s New Deal, liberals, unions, southern whites, the urban poor as well as immigrants and minorities. Although this coalition had lost its dominance as the south became increasing able to vote Republican and Reagan appealed to the white working class, Democrats running for the presidency could still expect to win the black and Latino vote. While  George W. Bush in 2004  won 44% of Latino votes he was the most successful republican candidate in history among Latino voters. Trump only won 28% in 2016.  In 2024 Trump’s Latino vote share was still only 45 per cent but it  surpassed George Bush.

Overall across the country, exit polls in 2024 showed a national drop in Democratic voters among those who trace their heritage from south and central America, from 71 per cent in 2012 under Barack Obama to just 53 per cent for Harris. Why? Ronald Reagan had famously declared that ‘Latinos are Republican. They just don't know it yet’ As Reagan suggested, the answer might be cultural. Latino and Hispanic people tend to oppose abortion, take a tough view on crime and value hard work and self-sufficiency, all good Republican values. The other explanation is the impact of illegal immigration, not just the well-known ‘pull up the draw bridge behind’ sentiment. where recent immigrants resent continued immigration since they are most likely to compete for their jobs and housing resources, but also the resentment of those who have arrived by a legal process for those who jumped the queue. It may also be that to vote for Trump, the anti-immigrant candidate, Latinos are asserting their own Americanness. “There seems to be an attraction to Trump among Latinos, Latino men, that could be a kind of defensive reaction to his aggression and aggressive rhetoric,” said Guillermo Grenier, professor of sociology at Florida International University and the co-author of the book This Land is Our Land: Newcomers and Established Residents in Miami. “It could be they’re saying: ‘I’m not one of them, you know? I’m an American citizen, I’m voting for you, I’m not the rapist scum, I’m not with them. That’s the other guys, the other immigrants, not the voting immigrants.”[89]

It is a mistake to describe the Latino vote as a homogeneous block. The young, men, women, established communities and those with different national origins vote differently. Carlos Suárez Carrasquillo, political science professor at the University of Florida’s centre for Latin American studies asked, “If white males find Trump appealing as a candidate, why wouldn’t Latino males?”[90] Trump won  47 percent of votes among Latino men, according to AP projections. He also produced double digit gains in majority-Hispanic counties along the Mexico border in Texas and in Southern Florida.

Possibility most significant impact of Trump’s success among Latino voter was in the key swing states.[91] In Florida Trump won 58% and in North Carolina 50% of the Latino vote. In Pennsylvania, he won 42% of the Latino vote where   Puerto Ricans are the largest group despite Puerto Rico being described as a  “floating island of garbage” at Trump’s Madison Square Garden rally barely a week before the election and despite his repeated claims that many immigrants were “drug dealers”, “murderers” and “rapists”, and  his promise to conduct the largest deportation effort in US history soon after he takes office. It was not just that Trump appealed to Latino voters more than expected, it was that he appealed to these voters in the states that mattered.

In 2024 while Black voters remained largely loyal to the Democrats, Trump significantly cut into Democrats' margins with Black voters. In the swing state of Wisconsin for example  in previous election years, typically about 9-in-10 Black voters in the state  backed the Democratic candidate. In 2024, it was only about three-quarters.[92] In the key state of Pennsylvania Black voters  didn't change much overall; they were down marginally for Harris, but in 2020, Black men voted 89%-10% for Biden but in 2024 support among the group for Harris was just 72%-24%. As with Latino voters Trumpism appealed to young men regardless of race. Overall 2024 indicated that the Democrats can no longer rely on being the party of  diversity.

While Harris underperformed among young women Trump  overperformed among young men. Trump is of course old- objectively he is an old candidate, but his persona is young. As with   Trump’s machismo and willingness to afront the sensibilities of bourgeois Americans struck a chord among young men. However young men are also moving to the right. The key demographic of young men has shifted, men between the ages of 18 and 29 from Democrats by nearly 30 points to the right since 2020, when they had voted for Joe Biden by a margin of 15 percent.  The growing ideological gender divide  has been commented on extensively[93]. Women are increasingly identifying as liberal, while men are shifting toward more conservative views.    In the US, Gallup data shows that after decades where the sexes were each spread roughly equally across liberal and conservative world views, women aged 18 to 30 are now 30 percentage points more liberal than their male contemporaries. Possible explanations include the increasing effect of algorithms which creates information feedback loops which reinforce gendered views, or the ‘equality paradox’ where countries with higher levels of social equality between men and women show a greater ideological divide.[94] In other words, the wealthier and more egalitarian the country, the greater the genders are divided ideologically. Republicans have successfully utilised this masculine imagery to win voters as well as associate feminised imagery with liberal values. Hulk Hogan’s appearance at the Republican convention contrasted with Kamala’s Taylor Swift endorsement. Hogan is a comic figure to many liberals but along with the ‘sports bros’ such as Rogan and ‘tech bros’ like Musk, the appeal directed at young men.

The emergence of hyper masculinity in popular culture and in politics may be because as societies become relatively more prosperous and equal, people more fully express their underlying traits and preferences. Another hypothesis suggests post-industrial economies favour soft skills which women tend to possess such as group cohesion, communication and empathy or it may simply be that men find it hard to accept the challenge to their traditional patriarchal privileges.   Richard Reeves’s 2022 book Of Boys and Men: Why the Modern Male Is Struggling, Why It Matters, and What to Do About It points to male crisis with poorer educational outcomes with fewer men graduating from college and worsening standardized test scores and the worsening mental health, loneliness and suicide crises among young men. This he says breeds resentment which conservatives have presented as a zero sum game where the success of women has come at the expense of men. Michael Kimmel, in his book Angry White Men, argues a sense of aggrieved entitlement is central to the experiences of white American men drawn to the far-right.[95]

"If you are a man in this country and you don't vote for Donald Trump, you're not a man," said Charlie Kirk, a conservative activist  has built a large following with his podcast, The Charlie Kirk Show. ranked #7 in Apple podcasts in news and #10 on Spotify in news.

Did Harris also fail to reach out to this group? Her campaign relied on mobilising women, anti-Trump Republicans and fearful immigrants but all of these groups were fractured and Kamla’s decision to not go on Rogan suggested she saw young men as a lost cause and the endorsement by Taylor Swift only reinforce the famine, leftist tone of her campaign.

Many democrats as well as Kamala pinned their hopes on the votes of women. There seemed plenty of reasons to expect that women would turn out for Kamala. This had been significant in the midterm elections of 2022 where the female vote was credited with preserving the Democrats control of the Senate. With Donald Trump’s well-documented history of misogyny,  the importance of abortion and the right to choose as an issue and a female presidential candidate, opinion polls showed a clear lead for Kamala among women. Kamala did indeed succeed in winning more female votes, but in smaller numbers than her Democratic predecessors. While Hillary Clinton won women by 13 points in 2016 and Joe Biden by 15 in 2020, Harris secured them by just 10 points.[96] Harris won Latina women by 24 points, significantly less than Hilary  Clinton’s 44-point lead in 2016. So overall the female vote failed to materialise in the numbers hoped for by the Democrats. Why?  The answer might be simply the scale of Trumps victory in both the popular and electoral college vote. After all it may simply be that Kamala was not the right candidate and her message did not resonate as effectively as Trump’s. Women who ran in 2024 did well, with more winning races against men in Senate contests on both sides of the aisle. Trump connected with Americans on cost-of-living pressures, while Harris chose to promote the strength of the economy, which may explain why a slim majority (51 per cent) of married women voted for Trump. The prices in the stores made Kamala look complacent and unapologetic.

There is also misogyny and racism. In an article in the Guadian Newspaper Judith Levine gave an account of the misogyny and racism which Kamala’s candidacy unleashed. Attacks on her from the hard maga republicans

‘Tim Burchett, the Tennessee Republican representative, called Harris, the child of a Black Jamaican father and an Indian mother, a DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) hire – picked, that is, because she is Black, not because she’s qualified. Donald Trump’s running mate, JD Vance, insinuated that Harris is a welfare queen. “What the hell have you done other than collect a check?” he asked at a Michigan rally of Harris, a former state attorney general, US senator and now the vice-president. At the same time, social media posts showing Harris with her parents falsely claim she’s not really Black, because her father is light-skinned.’[97]

Levine describe the even more outrageous sexism.

‘Far-right blogger Matt Walsh and former Fox host Megyn Kelly suggested Harris slept her way to the top. Conspiracy theorist Laura Loomer went further, alleging that the veep was “once an escort”

But haven’t Americans learned to tune out these comments or see them as caricatures of rational debate, almost comedic. In 2021, JD Vance,  criticized Harris and several other prominent Democrats as being “childless cat ladies” which was generally greeted with hilarity. Other commentators, however, point to the huge volume of on-line hate, misogyny and racism which results from the high profile attacks. The effect is to surround women and particularly women of colour with a sense of suspicion and exoticism, so that its possible to object to them by not acknowledging the racism or sexism but simply being ‘uncertain’ feeling she ‘cant be trusted’ or ‘isn’t right for the job’. This ‘gut feeling’ that Kamala is weak or not capable wears a homespun innocence and masks the underlying racism or sexism.

Melanie Smith who is the Director of Research for ISD US based in Washington DC, and leads a team of analysts focused on detecting, exposing and mitigating the threats associated with online disinformation operations, believes the bottom line is always mysogenny “They’re not trolling her just to troll her. There’s a broader effort at play that is connected to undermining women’s participation in democracy and women holding office,” she said. “There is this bigger agenda.”[98]

Former Vice Presidents don’t do as well at becoming presidents as you might imagine[99]. How to thread the needle of being different to the incumbent and thereby seen disloyal, or cowardly for not making these difference clear at the time, or the remain loyal and accept responsibility for the incumbent’s failings. Kamala was unable to distance herself from Biden in an election where the candidate of change would have an advantage. Biden was unpopular and although history may be kinder to Biden when some of his landmark legislation shows its effect, his approval rating was dismal. Doug Sosnik, a longtime advisor to Bill Clinton said "In general, for a Democratic candidate running in this environment, I think that would be challenging. Then, obviously, if you're the vice president of the administration, that makes it even harder."[100]  APVoteCast, a survey of over 120,000 voters nationwide, found that more than half of voters wanted to see substantial change.[101] A CNN exit poll found that voters gave Biden a -19 point approval rating. When Kamala repeatedly stated that she regretted nothing from Biden’s term, she could be commended for loyalty but it was not what voters wanted to hear. Kamala choice of Tim Waltz as her running mate seemed bold although less savvy than choosing Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro. Walz’s hesitant performance in  in debates and liberal record did little to reach out to those who were leaning towards Trump. In fairness Trumps pick, JD Vance, was widely seen as a disaster. Most commentators agree that running mates neither add nor detract from most campaigns.

 Then there was Kamala. Was she the right candidate? While her campaign hit the ground running and was slick, professional and well-funded, as noted earlier this may not have been an advantage since it seemed like so many previous establishment campaigns, designed by focus groups. Professional but also inauthentic. Kamala would not have been the Democrat candidate had there been time enough to choose another. She was an underwhelming VP and underwhelming public speaker with an underwhelming message and she had never shown that she could win on the national stage alone.

The manner of her selection , by default rather than choice, was an inescapable weakness. Trump harped on the idea that Biden had been subject to a coup and reminded audiences that kamala had not forged her candidacy in the heat of a primary process. Had she known that Biden was mentally incapable? When had she known? Had she supported an incapable president? Had she lied and covered up for him? When did she turn on him and had she allowed him to begin a fruitless re-election campaign in order to run down the clock on potential rivals? It hung over her campaign along with the reverberations from Biden’s cataclysmic meltdown of a debate. Debate are in general massively overhyped, as a media heavy weight battle, but mostly having the limited  impact of confirming previously held opinions,[102] but this was different. Biden’s obvious frailty was hideously exposed.[103] Why had he not stepped aside? Had those around him including Kamala been too spinless to tell him or had they attempted to hoodwink the US people? These were easy targets for Trump.

However, didn’t Kamala have an ace to play? She was the first non white woman to run for the presidency. That was surely a flag around which those who wanted change as well as the young, women and all those who saw a new America on the horizon, might gather. A first it seemed possible and Trump seemed rattled. Trump complained that Biden had gone and commentators observed that he seemed tired or unable to find a successful attack line on Kamala. Trump’s choice of  JD Vance was widely seen as a sign of overconfidence and possibly a big mistake. The opinion polls became neck and neck and many expected Kamala to pull ahead. She was younger, smarter,  more optimistic and in sharp contrast to Trump’s relentless divisiveness she called for inclusivity. Pollster and commentator Frank Luntz pointed to a tactical error in Harris’ campaign, which had at first changed the message from Biden's, that Trump posed an existential threat to democracy,  to prioritising a forward-looking "joyful" message about protecting personal freedoms and uniting all Americans. However in the later stage of the campaign Harris had returned to attacks on Trump and dire threats to democracy. Luntz tweeted ‘Kamala Harris lost this election when she pivoted to focus almost exclusively on attacking Donald Trump.

Voters already know everything there is about Trump – but they still wanted to know more about Harris’ plans for the first hour, first day, first month and first year of her administration. It was a colossal failure for her campaign to shine the spotlight on Trump more than on Harris’ own ideas’.[104]

Ultimately her campaign stalled as she failed to convince people that she had a big idea which might connect with their sense of insecurity and hurt. She had been chosen by Biden and anointed by the party her claim to be a change maker simply remained unconvincing.

Overall then why did Trump win in 2024?

In the late 1970s I attended a lecture in London given by the historian A J P Taylor, his topic was the causes of World War One. After an hour or so of outlining, without notes, al the contextual causes; an arms race, imperial rivals, alliances etc.. he concluded with the observation that in the end the war might have been avoided in Gavrilo Princip had not shot the Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand. So it might be with Trump. The polarising of American politics, the shifting demographics and the rise of Trumpian populism might have stalled but for the price of eggs. With no inflation spike in the Biden years the outcome might have been different and indeed the explanation is simply ‘the economy, stupid’.

While this might be true, the larger changes  and shifting tectonics of US and world politics have provided the fertile ground for Trumpism and it is highly likely that when time claims Trump, as it must in the not too distant future, much of Trumpism and the changes he represents will remain.

The constitutional experiment in the US is about to get another stress test which even if it survives the next four years intact, the Republican and Democrat Parties have already undergone a profound change. They are no longer the broad amorphous movements whose crosscutting nature made American politics uniquely consensual and without this unifying pragmatism the long term future of the American experiment remains uncertain.

[1] Fire and Fury - Wikipedia

[2] Rex Tillerson kind of admitted he called Trump a ‘moron’ | CNN Politics

[3] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/feb/20/presidents-ranking-trump-biden-list

[4] James Madison and the Dilemmas of Democracy | Freedom of Thought

[5] 'What is the EU?' trends on Google hours after Brexit result announced | London Evening Standard | The Standard

[6] Are We Living In James Madison’s Nightmare? https://liberalarts.tamu.edu/blog/2022/07/26/are-we-living-in-james-madisons-nightmare/

[7] I don’t want you to be hopeful. I want you to panic. I want you to feel the fear I feel every day. And then I want you to act.

— Greta Thunberg, January 2019

[8] Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? (London: Verso, 2016

[9] The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism

by Martin Wolf.

Post capitalism by Paul Mason

Capitalism in Crisis

by Charles Hampden-Turner

How Democracy Ends

by David Runciman…..( just a few recent books)

[10] America’s Anxiety Crisis Affecting 1 in Every 7 Adults

[11] Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order

John J. Mearsheimer

[12] The ‘super year’ of elections has been super bad for incumbents as voters punish them in droves

[13] Democracy Versus Democracy: The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy

Authors

Michael Ignatieff

[14] The people is sublime: the long history of populism, from Robespierre to Trump

[15] Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024 | Pew Research Center

[16] Gallup has found the presidential honeymoon period is getting shorter and shorter. By the last few decades of the 20th century, the typical honeymoon period had shrunk to seven months, down from an average of 26 months earlier in American history:

[17] Trust in U.S. Supreme Court Continues to Sink | The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania

[18] Populists in Power Around the World

[19] Mercantilism: The theory that explains Trump’s trade war

[20] Battle cries such as ‘build the wall!’ or ‘no more mosques!’ set boundaries in place to keep the sacred people safe from outside threats.

[21] Half of Americans’ top-ten priorities for success are about a meaningful life, including being able to do work that has a positive impact on other people, enjoying their work, being enjoyable to be around, having a purpose in life, and being actively involved in their community. In contrast, being rich is ranked in the bottom third of all priorities (45 of 61) https://populace.org/research

[22] Americans don’t fault people for pursuing great wealth. More than 8 in 10 (84%) agree “there is nothing wrong with a person trying to make as much money as they honestly can.” https://www.cato.org/publications/survey-reports/what-americans-think-about-poverty-wealth-work#overview

[23] People are more tolerant of inequality when it is expressed in terms of individuals rather than groups at the top Jesse Walker, Stephanie J. Tepper

[24] 70% say government should try to eliminate causes of poverty rather than increase welfare benefits https://www.cato.org/publications/survey-reports/what-americans-think-about-poverty-wealth-work#overview

[25] Changing the narrative on wealth inequality .Joseph Rowntree Foundation

[26] Actual mobility patterns, however, suggest that non-meritocratic factors may actually be more important in the U.S. than in other countries. A person's educational and economic outcomes, for instance, are more closely tied to one's family of origin in the U.S. than in many other industrialized countries (Beller and Hout, 2006, Ermisch et al., 2012, Jäntti et al., 2006).

[27] https://www.stlouisfed.org/institute-for-economic-equity/the-state-of-us-wealth-inequality

[28]  Low Wage Americans Lose Faith in Social Mobility -Brookings

[29] Bowling Alone : The Collapse and Revival of American Community

Putnam, Robert D.

[30] McCann, P. (2020). Perceptions of regional inequality and the geography of discontent: Insights from the UK. Regional Studies, 54: 256–267.

[31]Cramer, K.J. (2016). The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[32] Golfing with Trump. Social capital, decline, inequality, and the rise of populism in the US

Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, Neil Lee, Cornelius Lipp

[33] More than half of American renters who want to buy a home worry they may never afford it

Survey shows 86% of renters want to buy a home but cannot afford it, and 54% of those renters believe homeownership will remain unattainable. This concern is more pronounced among older adults.

[34] Global Land Alliance and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

[35] Ontological security and psychosocial benefits from the home: qualitative evidence on issues of tenure

[36]Trends in income and wealth inequality

By Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik and Rakesh Kochhar  Pew Research

[37] The Distribution of Household Income, 2018

[38] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-inequality-debate

[39] Ekins, E. (October, 2019). Young Americans are more likely to resent the rich.

[40] Pew Research

[41] https://www.heritage.org/conservatism/commentary/trumps-win-ordinary-americans-declared-independence-the-elites

[42] “Vulgarity in a king flatters the majority of the nation.” Maxims for revolutionaries

[43] "A slave dreams not of his freedom, but of his slaves." Author: Mark Tullius Cicero.

[44]https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/shattered-democrats-grapple-kamala-harris-loss-rcna178967

[45] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/kamala-s-agenda-is-they-them-not-you-trump-campaign-video/vi-AA1rEKBS

[46] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/video/archival-video-pat-buchanan-speaks-1992-republican-national-40578648

[47] An analysis of the capture of the Republican party and the national agenda from the late 1970s into the 1990s by a coalition of political and religious conservatives. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/8274866/

[48] The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America is Tearing Us Apart: by Bill Bishop

[49]Spatial Polarization of Presidential Voting in the United States, 1992–2012: The “Big Sort” Revisited

[50] Andrew Hartman, A War for the Soul of America. A History of the Culture Wars

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015

[51] https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/03/05/few-americans-express-positive-views-of-trumps-conduct-in-office/

[52] Moral Combat: How Sex Divided American Christians and Fractured American Politics R. Marie Griffith

[53] Trump doubles down on male victimhood Washington Post October 3, 2018

[54] https://religionnews.com/2016/05/05/mark-demoes-liberty-board-trump-evangelicals/

[55] Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization

[56] According to NBC’s exit poll, as in the 2020 and 2016 elections, he kept a steady hold on the support of white Evangelical Christians, taking 81 per cent of their vote. He also extended his lead among Roman Catholic voters to 15 per cent: 56 to 41.

[57] Social media echo chambers gifted Donald Trump the presidency

[58] https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review

[59] How Scandal Derailed Gary Hart’s Presidential Bid

[60] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwkNnMrsx7Q

[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyMosJdIfdo

[62] Donald Trump Says He Could 'Shoot Somebody' Without Losing Votes

[63] Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review

[64] (Almost) Everything in Moderation: New Evidence on Americans' Online Media Diets

[65] Breaking the Social Media Prism by Chris Bail

[66] Echo Chambers, Fake News, and Social Epistemology

[67] Exposure to untrustworthy websites in the 2016 U.S. election

[68] https://www.howwegottonow.com/post/desensitization

[69] Donald Trump voters: We like the president’s lies

[70] The Strange Case of Donald J. Trump: A Psychological Reckoning

Dan P. McAdams

[71] We're in a post-truth world with eroding trust and accountability. It can't end well The Guardian Nick Enfield

[72] Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the “Post-Truth” Era

[73] https://newrepublic.com/post/188197/trump-media-information-landscape-fox

[74] https://sites.imsa.edu/acronym/2021/03/04/elon-musk-is-not-an-entrepreneur-hes-a-rich-deceitful-hack//

[75] https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/survey-results/daily/2024/09/11/65237/3

[76] Robert Thompson Syracuse University quoted in https://www.sfchronicle.com/entertainment/article/kamala-harris-celebrity-endorsement-19895290.php

[77] https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/trump-conviction-maga-prophets-1235033898/

[78] https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/1iun73v91l/cbs_20230820_1%20%281%29.pdf

[79] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/05/10/upshot/trump-memories-poll.html

[80] https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/11/22/views-of-trump-personal-traits-confidence-on-issues-ideology/

[81] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/14/us/elections/trump-promises-extreme-rhetoric.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock

[82] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/12/trump-shithole-countries-lost-in-translation

[83] https://www.npr.org/2024/11/09/nx-s1-5184401/voter-frustration-with-rising-prices-had-a-major-impact-on-the-election

[84]  https://hub.jhu.edu/2024/11/20/how-inflation-impacted-2024-election/

[85] https://apnews.com/article/economy-trump-inflation-prices-election-tariffs-immigrants-e791d15158195a8a15a71ee43c77d749

[86] https://hub.jhu.edu/2024/11/20/how-inflation-impacted-2024-election/

[87] https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/immigration-2024-us-presidential-election-campaign-policy-stalemate-disinformation-and

[88] https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2024/02/11/trump-biden-immigration-border-compared/

[89] How Trump won over Latino and Hispanic voters in historic numbers Richard Luscombe. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/09/trump-latino-hispanic-vote-election

[90] How Trump won over Latino and Hispanic voters in historic numbers Richard Luscombe

[91] https://www.as-coa.org/articles/how-latinos-voted-2024-us-presidential-election

[92] https://www.npr.org/2024/11/22/nx-s1-5199119/2024-election-exit-polls-demographics-black-latino-voters

[93] A new global gender divide is emerging

[94] Gender stereotypes can explain the gender-equality paradox

[95] Angry White Men: American Masculinity at the End of an Era

[96] https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2024/politics/2020-2016-exit-polls-2024-dg/

[97] Conservatives’ racist and sexist attacks on Kamala Harris show exactly who they are

Judith Levine

[98] https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-in-the-news/melanie-smith-on-rising-racist-and-misogynistic-online-disinformation-targeting-kamala-harris/

[99] Most U.S. vice presidents in recent decades have sought the presidency, but relatively few have won

[100] https://www.businessinsider.com/harris-lost-biden-unpopularity-trump-election-2024-11

[101] https://apnews.com/article/ap-votecast-trump-harris-election-president-voters-86225516e8424431ab1d19e57a74f198

[102] Presidential Debates Have Shockingly Little Effect on Election Outcomes

[103] Biden’s disastrous debate pitches his reelection bid into crisis

[104] https://x.com/FrankLuntz/status/1854058416920293410